CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.
A REFORMATION PERSPECTIVE

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I. Who is man?

No question seems more intensely bound up with the search for the ultimate meaning and significance of existence than the question of man. In the rush of daily life people are inclined to by-pass the question — until illness or accident befalls them or the suffering of others becomes inescapable fact.

It is not without reason that the question of man, of who he is, arises in situations where, in one way or another, evil is manifest. That’s how it was when history began, when the first human couple hid, revealing awareness of themselves — naked and vulnerable for each other and towards the Creator. That’s how it still is today, when people find that ‘ordinary folk’ are capable of hating and killing one another.

Philosophical questioning after man can never be a purely academic affair; the relation between self-reflection and evil prohibits that. The Jewish thinker Abraham Joshua Heschel (1966, 13-14) is very frank about this:

Philosophy, to be relevant, must offer us a wisdom to live by — relevant not only in the isolation of our study rooms but also in moments of facing staggering cruelty and the threat of disaster. The question of man must be pondered not only in the halls of learning but also in the presence of inmates in extermination camps, and in the sight of the mushroom of a nuclear explosion.

But even apart from all sorts of violence, the question Who is man? is a pressing one today. Think of the various facets of the theme of ‘identity’. ‘De-pillerization’ (ontzuiling) brought a vacuum so that many could no longer articulate their identity in the traditional language of worldview, church and other institutions. The influx of migrant workers, fugitives, and asylum seekers rendered society multi-cultural. Their ‘strangeness’ referred people of the West to their own identity (see for instance Kristeva 1991). Liberalism and individualism threw people back upon themselves and contributed to a climate in which the weakest feel unsafe and threatened. New means of communication have brought people into contact with virtually everyone in the global world. In the network society identity is depicted as a brand. To be yourself means: being strong, showing who you are, putting yourself in the picture. Underneath this, one can feel insecurity and confusion. There is a lack of

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1 This text appeared in Dutch as a chapter in Van Woudenberg (1996). The author thanks J.N. Kraay for his conscientious translation of the chapter. Although my thoughts — for instance with respect to the I-self relationship and its importance for both philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychiatry and neuroscience — have developed over time, I have made only few textual improvements and additions compared to the original text. Some newer literature is added as far as it pertains to the original text.
meaning and a need for models and roles that convince. The (post)modern self has become dependent, needy, and unfulfilled.\footnote{For the scope and depth of this theme, see Charles Taylor (1989; 1991). For a social psychological and constructivist account, see Gergen (1991).}

II. *Philosophical anthropology: A brief exploration*

1. The task of a philosophical anthropology

There are, then, many aspects to the question ‘Who is man?’ — moral, sociocultural, psychological, linguistic and even biological. Of old it has been the task of philosophical anthropology to study the coherence of these aspects. We might call this the *structural* side of philosophical anthropological inquiry. Philosophers have been aware that this study cannot be separated from people’s views on the meaning and purpose of life. It comes naturally to people to want orientation, to probe the horizon in search of something that makes existence worthwhile, to seek meaning. Consequently, human life is characterized by restlessness and dynamism.

In brief, we can state that philosophical anthropology is about the question of the nature of man, that is, of the structural nature and dynamism of being-human. Is there, for example, a universal human nature? And if so, can this ‘universal’ be characterized more specifically?

The question about human nature divides into a number of sub-questions. I select three of them:

1. the question of the distinction between man and animal;
2. the question of the relation between body and spirit (or mind);
3. the question of the identity of the person.

All three questions are extremely topical in contemporary philosophy. Let me illustrate this in the next very brief review.

2. The distinction between man and animal

Much reflection on man is inspired by evolutionary biology, sociobiology and evolutionary psychology that is grafted on the latter (see Wilson 1975, Pinker 2002, Buller 2006). The search is for parallels between animal and human behaviour. The animal world is determined by the laws of natural selection and survival of the fittest. Similarly, in the world of man the kinds of behaviour that prevail are those that have the highest reproductive advantage and survival value. The altruism debate shows how even moral behaviour is thought to be explainable by evolutionary mechanisms.

To be sure, for some adherents of these notions man and animal are different. The difference is that human beings come ‘unfinished’ and helpless into the world. Compared to most animals the baby is ‘retarded’. In contrast to the animal it lacks the skills needed to stay alive and depends on outside assistance and support. During its development it has to learn to cope with
continuously changing circumstances. To be human implies transforming this disadvantage, the lack of environment-specific equipment, into an advantage, an ability to maintain oneself flexibly in a manifold of situations.

It was the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche who spoke of man as ‘das noch nicht festgestellte Tier’ (the still undetermined animal), thereby anticipating the so-called retardation theory, just mentioned.\textsuperscript{3} Arnold Gehlen (1988) points out that this characterization is purposely ambiguous. Man is not only unfinished, not yet prepared for his task and always busy to acquire skills that serve adaptation and survival. He is also open to the world. In a very literal sense, no-one has yet ‘determined’ who man is, and it is likely on principle that this cannot be done. If anything is universal in human nature at all it is this indeterminateness, the never-ending self-positioning in relation to the Umwelt and oneself.

3. The relation between body and spirit (mind or soul)

Libraries contain reams of writings on the relation between body and spirit, so I restrict myself to the what is absolutely necessary here.\textsuperscript{4}

Views on the relation between body and spirit can roughly be divided into two main groups: monistic conceptions and dualistic conceptions.

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Dualism} & \textbf{Monism} \\
\hline
Hierarchical theories & Materialism \\
Dualistic interactionism & Idealism \\
Epiphenomenalism & Psychomonism \\
Psychophysical parallelism & Identity theory \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textit{Dualistic conceptions} have always been intuitively attractive, because they correspond with the perception of death. The spirit (or soul) is identified with the spirit of ‘life’, i.e., the living body. This spirit not only includes the higher psychic faculties but also breathing, temperature and locomotion. The cold and rigid corpse is a body from which the spirit has fled. The last breath is the moment of the soul’s departure.

There are numerous versions of this dualistic view. In \textit{hierarchical dualism} the spirit is of an order higher than that of the body. Plato, for instance, dismissed the sensible and the tangible. The body is the prison of the soul. The soul is\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{3} This retardation theory, developed by the Dutch biologist Louis Bolk (1866-1930), is now considered obsolete. Developmental psychologists and neurobiologists do not consider the baby as passive recipient, but have found that the baby already at birth possesses a refined motor repertoire and advanced sensory skills. By way of its specific bio-psychical equipment it models and initiates the mother–child interaction from the start. See for instance Stern (1985).

\textsuperscript{4} One of the best introductions still is van Peursen (1956/1966).
committed for life to participate in the higher, divine world of the eternal ideas. The soul however is thwarted in this quest by the body, bound to the sensible and the lower, earthly desires. In Plato’s *Phaedrus* we read the famous comparison of the charioteer who tries to control a pair of horses. One of them is noble and good, while the other has the opposite character. The winged steed strives upwards to the arch of heaven while the horse that has shed its wings wants to remain earthbound (246a ff). In Aristotle we find a hierarchical view as well, although for him the higher–lower scheme is not primarily meant to place the soul in relation to the body. It brings order to the various ‘form principles’, each of which manifests a particular type of soul. Aristotle distinguishes between the nutritive soul, expressed in plant life; the feeling soul, expressed *par excellence* in the animal world; and the thinking soul, typical for the human being (*De anima* 408a 16-17; 414a 30 – 415a 14; 433a 9 – 435a 10).

Another version of dualism is *dualistic interactionism*. René Descartes (1596-1650), one of the most important representatives of this approach, described body and soul as two radically different ‘substances’, whereby the body is characterized by spatial extension (*res extensa*) and the soul by the ability think (*res cogitans*). He locates immaterial consciousness over against the material body (dualism). Body and soul are of a different order altogether, although they do exert influence upon each other (interaction) by way of the pineal gland, a small organ at the lower part of the brain. Philosopher Karl Popper and neuro-physiologist John Eccles, who together wrote a book (1977) on the body–mind (or mind–brain) problem, belong to the more recent adherents of dualistic interactionism, be it without supporting the dubious pineal gland theory.

A separate version of dualism is *epiphenomenalism*. Here the spirit or mind is considered as a side product (epiphenomenon) of brain activity. The causal direction is one-sided: the body, i.e. the brain, causes mental processes, it is not the other way around. Mental activity cannot cause neural activity. Since no independence separate from the material body is attributed to the mind, epiphenomenalism is sometimes counted as belonging to the group of monistic conceptions. Another, currently more popular term that is used for this latter conception is non-eliminative physicalism — physicalism because there is only one reality, the physical reality; non-eliminative, because mental phenomena are not reduced to physical phenomena. They are, instead, thought to ‘supervene’ on the physical world (Kim 1993).\(^5\)

A last variant of body–spirit dualism that should be mentioned is *psychophysical parallelism*. Like Descartes, defenders of this view look upon body and mind as two separate and dissimilar substances. They differ from Descartes however because they reject possible interaction. Between body and mind there are no causal connections. When you turn red in the face this is not the effect of the inner feeling of anger. We may indeed have the impression that the condition of the mind influences the body, but this is because they run

\(^5\) See Murphy (1998), (2006) and Murphy and Brown (2007) for a defense of this position from a Christian point of view.
‘side by side’ in perfect harmony. The relation between body and mind is one of simultaneity. In religious versions of this approach God is seen as the one who effectuates the parallel chains of events in both the body and the mind (occasionalism).

Monistic views characteristically share the rejection of an essential distinction between body and mind. In some cases the spiritual is reduced to the corporeal (materialism); in other — less frequent — cases the corporeal is reduced to the spiritual (idealism, psychomonism). So-called identity theory offers a third variation: both body and mind are manifestations of one and the same background reality. Body and mind are no separate entities; they are ways of appearing or functioning (or: manners of speaking) about that which at bottom is the same, hence identical.

The various dualisms and monisms as described above are ideal types. At present the debate on the relation between brain and mind is very lively, influenced as it is by developments in cognitive psychology and neurobiology. Debaters discuss a whole range of intermediate or hybrid forms of the versions just mentioned. One important shift in the landscape concerns the meaning of the term ‘identity theory’. Today this term usually refers to form of materialism (or: physicalism). That which is ‘identical’ is the physical (or: material) world. The existence of mental properties is accepted, but the existence of mental entities is denied. Or, to put it in a different way, the existence of mental phenomena is recognized as epistemological reality, but not as metaphysical reality (hence the term non-eliminative or non-reductive physicalism) (Kim 1993). Non-eliminative physicalism combines a monist metaphysics with a dualist epistemology.

4. Personal identity

Another much-discussed philosophical topic today is the theme of personal identity. We find widespread interest in it in Anglo-Saxon or analytical philosophy, hermeneutic philosophy, and post-modern thinking.6

In philosophy the issue of personal identity is inextricably intertwined with a number of stubborn problems in the philosophy of consciousness. These questions are not only theoretical ones; they have a degree of intuitive attraction as well. The basic issue here is that in seeking to answer the question Who am I? we cannot get around consciousness. After all, the question is answered by way of reflection. There can be no reflection without consciousness.

We get hints that there is a problem here as soon as we try to explain to others how we experienced something. Nobody experiences things the way I do, and nobody is conscious of him/herself in the way I am conscious of myself. In other words: it is because of consciousness that I am a person, a subject.

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6 For clear introductions, see Glover (1988), Cassam (1994), and for the hermeneutic tradition Ricoeur (1992).
But the moment this is said two important philosophical problems emerge:

1. The problem of *solipsism* (literally: being ‘alone’ in ‘oneself’): How can I make the other understand how I experience things; am I not locked up inside myself?

2. The problem of *other minds*: How can I gain access to the inner world of the other?

It is not hard to see that these problems are the legacy of a tradition of thought starting with Descartes (see also Van Woudenberg 1992). In his quest for ultimate certainty he arrived at the renowned *Cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am) as indubitable starting point for all knowing. Thinking can find no support in the realities outside of man (I can only know them via the contents of my consciousness), nor in sensible perception (which may rest on illusion), nor in established concepts (for they proceed from custom and tradition). The only certainty is the existence of my consciousness as methodically doubting consciousness — and thus the unshakable starting-point for all knowing. The fact of my existing — I am — is founded in thinking: ‘I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind’ (Descartes, 2nd Meditation). From then (1641) onwards, identity has been inseparably bound up with (self)consciousness.

This approach invites a number of difficulties, two of which were just mentioned: solipsism and the problem of other minds. A common response to both difficulties is that people can report their inner experiences, including the experiences with their *I*-s or selves. To be sure, no report will be complete, but this also holds for reports on what happens outside of me. If the problem of the self would mostly be a matter of descriptive completeness, then there would be less of a philosophical problem than we initially suspected. Completeness is an empirical matter, not a matter of principle. So, does the solution of the problem of personal identity not exist in the capacity to report (verbally) about the ‘self’ that is present, or re-presented, in one’s self-consciousness?

This solution, however, does not get at the heart of the problem. Whatever ‘self-representations’ these reports refer to, these representations are representations of a conscious ‘I’ that does not coincide with the representation(s). The I (self) is not identical with its representations. Behind the representations

7 Psychological and philosophical *behaviourism* has tried to turn the solipsistic need into a virtue by saying that behaviours and verbal utterances that refer to the inner self are mistakenly understood to refer to an imperceptible, immaterial reality somewhere within the human being; there is no ghost in the machine (the body). The entire tradition that bases itself on introspective data should be transformed into a theory of publicly observable behaviour such as verbal utterances and motor expressions. We customarily attribute to the inner self something that in fact is a certain way of organization of behaviour that can be perceived by the senses. Classic for this approach — in philosophy — is Gilbert Ryle’s *The concept of mind* (1949). The phrase ‘ghost in the machine’ is Ryle’s. However, the complete rejection of a subjective, introspectively knowable inner self still betrays dependence on the Cartesian way of questioning: behaviourism maintains without restriction the Cartesian gap between subject (consciousness) and object (empirically observable reality). Efforts are made to close the gap by reducing this subjectivism as much as possible to the intersubjectively (public) and (hence) objectively observable. It should be noted though that with the rise of cognitive psychology — prepared as it is to accept mental representations and schemes — hard-core behaviourism is clearly in retreat.
there is always a re-presenting I (or: self). And as soon as the representing self itself is represented, there again emerges another 'hidden' I or self. This is the theme of the 'receding I': the search for an I (or self) that leads to infinite regress. Applied to Descartes' *Cogito* by trying to trace back to the 'I' that thinks, one does not straightforwardly arrive at the I, but at the consciousness of such a thinking 'I'. But at the origin of this consciousness there is again an 'I' that is conscious of its thinking activity — and so on, infinitely, until all that remains is a shadowy idea we call 'I' of 'self'. The further one reasons backwards the more enigmatic the 'I' becomes.\(^8\)

Exactly this is the starting-point of another tradition in thinking about identity, a sceptical tradition, which begins with David Hume (1711-1776) and continues until today with philosophers such as Derek Parfit and Daniel Dennett. Hume (1739-1740. 300 [Book I, Part IV, Section 6]) says: "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception." The I or self is nothing but a collection of perceptions. At any rate there is nothing singular or identical to be discovered in myself. According to Hume, the 'personal identity' we speak of is essentially a succession of perceptions that derive their coherence from their similarity and continuity in time. Recently, Parfit (1984) defended a similar position.

This brings us to another difficulty in the philosophy-of-consciousness approach to the theme of personal identity. We just noted that when thinking turns back to ask about the thinking I, the I changes into a shadowy, theoretical entity. Every attempt to know the I ends in a sort of objectification that simultaneously alienates the I as subject from itself. In self-reflection the self becomes a quasi object, existing more or less independently of the knowing subject. In other words, the Cartesian gap between subject and object is repeated in self-knowledge. But, as Jean Paul Sartre (1936/1960) said, the I is not a thing, it is not an object. The quasi-objective self does no justice to the most basic datum of self-experience, namely that I am involved with myself, that I can be 'affected' and that in the acts that reveal my selfhood best, I do not have my 'self' before me as an object or project but leave my 'self' behind me. The spontaneous person, the one who forgets himself — he is the one who shows most who he is. In sum, to link human identity exclusively to being-conscious-of-oneself is to run into the problem of self-objectification. In the Cartesian approach this self-objectification is both unavoidable and fatal.

\(^8\) Precisely this transformation of the concrete I into a theoretical I was the reason for philosophers like Kant and Husserl to distinguish, next to the empirical I, a transcendental I. These thinkers do not consider the 'theorization' of the I as a shortcoming; rather, it expresses something very essential: the transcendental I (ego) becomes the condition for knowing. The fact that I (empirical subject) can think thoughts (object) is possible only on the presupposition of a transcendental I as the necessary condition for the synthesis of the subjective and the objective moment in (self)-knowledge. This transcendental ego has a purely formal status, no empirical content at all.
because it cannot do justice to the fact that human beings are self-involved and fundamentally subjective.

This inability to solve these problems indicates that personal identity cannot be thought in the framework of the Cartesian philosophy of consciousness. It is not surprising, then, that many philosophers have criticized this approach. Strikingly enough this often leads to a more or less mitigated kind of naturalism, i.e. an approach that reformulates mental phenomena in terms of natural (physical) processes. This does not mean that we have just a crude reductionism (or materialism) here; according to many the mental is in fact nothing but an alternative and specific way of describing physical processes, a description focussed on the functional state or condition of the body or the brain, on the 'how' rather than the 'what'.

Richard Rorty uses the example of spoken language. Language actually consists in a sequence of sounds produced by movements of the larynx, tongue, oral cavity and lips. Analysis of the physical movements however does not give us the meaning of the sounds. Study of the meaning of sounds takes place in a language other than that of physics — a language that cannot depend on immediate observation, and must therefore rely on interpretation (Rorty 1980, 355). In other words, the fact that we attribute the meaning of sounds to a meaning-producing, immaterial substance we call spirit is the result of an erroneous habit of thinking. Meanings are no immaterial entities and neither is the spirit. Terms like 'meaning' and 'spirit' do not refer to the 'what' of something immaterial; they refer to the 'how' of the material (larynx movement, brain activity). Essentially, philosophy is a kind of therapy for mistaken thinking.

Applied to the theme of personal identity this means that according to naturalists, the I or the self should not be thought of as a series of perceptions introduced by an imaginary mental eye. The spirit is no inner theatre with the I as observer behind the scenes. The title of a volume edited by Hofstadter and Dennett (1981) is a play on words hinting at this criticism: The mind's I. There are many — often ludicrous — thought experiments demonstrating the nonsense of this conception, and showing how a naturalist approach is able to do justice to the psychological and (even) moral aspects of the experience of self.

Dennett summarized his views in a book entitled Consciousness Explained. There, he states that the self is

not any old mathematical point, but an abstraction defined by the myriads of attributions [features that are attributed to an I or self, GG] and interpretations (including self-attributions and self-interpretations) that have composed the biography of the living body whose Center of Narrative Gravity it is. (Dennett 1991, 426-427)

The self is an abstraction, according to Dennett. He thinks of it as a principle of organization that primarily has to do with the boundary between me and the rest of the world. As a spider spins itself a web to demarcate his territory, so humans weave a web of words and acts, and name it 'self'. People have the incorrigible inclination to assume a Dictator (an 'T) and his Headquarters
(consciousness) behind the web of self-interpretations. Still, all this is a cognitive illusion, Dennett suggests. Essentially, the self does not differ very much from an anthill or a beehive; observing these we also have the illusion that some invisible manager is at work. To be sure, humans and animals differ because we have language; our basic strategy of self-defence is that we tell stories. We do not as a rule spin these tales very consciously and with evident purpose — just as spiders do not spin their web that way; it is rather that the stories enmesh us. Consciousness and our narrative selfhood are the product of these stories, not their source. In short, the self is an artefact of the social processes that constitute us (Dennett 1991, 422-423).

III. Herman Dooyeweerd’s theses on the human being

1. Introduction

Sad to say, the founders of Reformed Philosophy never did write a systematic anthropology. 9 This is the more unfortunate in view of the lively contemporary discussions I referred to above. Nevertheless, in his 32 Theses on Man Dooyeweerd (1942) has presented a brief but important contribution. 10 Scattered throughout their writings other reformed philosophers have offered much anthropological material as well.

Initially, Dooyeweerd intended to devote the third part of Reformatie en scholastiek in de wijsbegeerte entirely to anthropology. It is not entirely clear why this did not happen. 11 He presented a summary of what he had in mind in the Theses just mentioned. In addition there are some important articles that appeared in Philosophia Reformata and the last part of A new critique (Dooyeweerd 1940; also Dooyeweerd 1953-1958, III, 694ff, 765ff, 781ff; and Dooyeweerd 1960a, 1960b, 1961).

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9 Ouweneel (1986) was the first to write a systematic treatise on man from a reformational philosophical perspective. After an extensive summary and apology for Dooyeweerd’s conception Ouweneel offers his own elaboration of the process of disclosure in human development (Chapter 3) and proposes to distinguish a perceptive substructure next to the sensitive substructure (see below).

10 This article is referred to as ‘Theses’ in the main text. The Theses were later published in students’ periodical Sola Fide 1954, 8-18. We will use a translation by John Vander Stelt (with minor corrections of the translator).

11 In an interview Dooyeweerd offers as reason for not publishing the second part that the “traditional-scholastic current ... suddenly lost its footing in the theological department at the Free University [Amsterdam].” (Van Dunné 1976, 54) This may have been one reason why the third part did not appear either. For his anthropology, too, dualism is Dooyeweerd’s major discussion partner, and this dualism rests on a ‘scholastic’ arrangement of independent substructures in man. Actually, a typescript of important sections of the third part survived (Ouweneel 1986, 17-20). The author had the opportunity to consult a 160-page translation prepared by the Dooyeweerd Centre, Ancaster (Canada). The first part deals with philosophy of nature, and overlaps Dooyeweerd’s (1950) article on the concept of substance. The second part, concerning anthropology, contains extensive confrontation with Gehlen, Scheler, and others, together with an elaboration of Dooyeweerd’s insights regarding the substructures, especially the act structure. It also contains reflections on the issue of evolution, on the body as formtotality, on the difference between man and animal, and on the supra-temporal heart.
In section II.1 above I said that the task of philosophical anthropology is to inquire the structural coherence of human functioning in its varied facets, and the clarification of the restlessness and dynamism of being human. This duality very exactly characterizes Dooyeweerd’s view of man. Stronger: he is always out to demonstrate that these two directions in anthropological inquiry are intrinsically interwoven. Moreover, on both points Dooyeweerd offers a philosophically new understanding of man. This new conception can be indicated with two key terms: man as enkaptic structural whole, and the idea of the (supra-temporal) heart as spiritual centre of the human being, pointing beyond itself. A word about these two key terms.

2. The body as enkaptic structural whole

To understand what Dooyeweerd means by ‘enkaptic structural whole’ we should recall some terms and distinctions (Van Woudenborg 1992, 136-41, 147-52).

Literally, enkapsis means ‘enclosure’, ‘interweavement’, ‘intertwinement’, ‘interlacement’. Dooyeweerd distinguishes enkaptic relationships from relations between a whole and its parts. In the relation between a whole and its parts the parts give up their independence, whereas the sum of the parts displays characteristics or qualities that none of the separate parts possesses. A plant, for example, consists of cells, but those cells are bound up with the whole of the plant such that they gain a new function: the whole of the plant determines the function of the separate cells.

Enkapsis is different. Here too we have an interlacement of ‘parts’, however, the own character of the ‘parts’ is not set aside and the enkaptic ‘sum’ as such does not display new characteristics. Instead of speaking of things, Dooyeweerd prefers to use the expression ‘thing structures’ or ‘individuality structures’. This is because scientific analysis aims at the structural side of things. The term enkapsis, therefore, refers to the interlacement between parts with respect to their structural side. Within the enkaptic (structural) interlacement, “the structures of things and events... have an independent internal leading function and an internal structural principle of their own.” (Dooyeweerd 1953-1958, III, 637).12

In his later work Dooyeweerd (1950) introduces a new term, enkaptic structural whole. Characteristic for the structural whole is that the part structures — as in the case of enkapsis — do retain their own internal structural principle, but — other than in enkapsis — are caught up together in a larger whole. This larger whole, in turn, has its own internal qualification and conforms to its own structural principle. This embracing structural principle orders the part structures in the larger whole. The larger whole is known by its ‘form’, either

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12 At issue here is the principle of sphere sovereignty. When Dooyeweerd draws attention to the relative autonomy of the parts with respect to the whole by saying that the former conform to their own structural principle, he is trying to do justice to the principle of sphere sovereignty in the theory of entitary (or thing) structures. Examples of enkapsis are the relation between living organisms and their environment, and the relation between matrimony and the state.
in its ‘objective-sensory shape’ or in its ‘objective cultural shape.’ (Dooyeweerd 1950, 75)

Examples of such enkaptic structural wholes are the bonds between atom and molecule, between bird and nest, between the sculpture and the marble of which it is made. Atoms, nests and physical material like marble, in other words, continue to conform to their internal structural principle. On the other hand, the qualifying (or leading) function of these enkaptically bound thing structures is determined by the nature of the entwinement. The goal of nests is qualified by the fact that they serve birds as biotic object, i.e. as repository of their eggs and as shelter for their offspring. In other words, nests are qualified by their biotic object function. Apart from the bird they lose their goal and are just physically qualified compilations of physical material. In the case of the sculpture — Dooyeweerd’s paradigm case is the famous Hermes of Praxiteles — the situation is more complex because in the enkaptic structure of works of art not only the physical thing structure of the marble is included, but also the design of the work as intentional object in the mind of its maker. The work of art is an objectification of this design within the physical structure of the marble — a structure that is now deepened and disclosed. As structural whole the sculpture is aesthetically qualified, and it is founded in the (historical) formative labour of the artist. Deepening and disclosure of the physical structure consists in the actualization of the marble’s object functions: the subjective design in the mind of the maker discloses the aesthetic object function of the physical material.

Dooyeweerd refers to the human body as enkaptic structural whole as well. In this connection two points need to be kept in mind. First, the term ‘body’ is understood here in the broadest possible sense, i.e. as ‘temporal, existential form of human life’ (Thesis VII). ‘Body’ does not only mean an arrangement of physico-chemical matter, it includes the body in a biotic, psychic and active sense. Secondly, there is a difference between the human body and other, non-human manifestations of an enkaptic structural whole such as birds’ nests and sculptures. The difference is that the body as totality of the temporal form of human existence is not itself qualified by a normative modal aspect (Thesis XXI). This is because the act structure is the highest qualifying structure and, as such, undifferentiated. Dooyeweerd calls the act structure the ‘plastic expression of the human spirit’ (Thesis XXII). This act structure is so plastic, i.e. so expressive, that it cannot be bound to one specific modal qualification.

How do we recognize the body as a whole? Here too Dooyeweerd’s answer is that this recognition is based on the form, that is, the ‘outer corporeal form’ as nodal point of interlacements. He elaborates what above I termed the ‘objective sensorial form’ of the enkaptic structural whole. The body can be recognized as a whole, a totality, because it takes on visible, audible and tangible form marked by identity (unity) and wholeness (totality). Further, structure and function of body organs can never be determined in isolation; determination is always in terms of their place within the body as form totality.
Since the body form is the knot of all intertwinements in the human body it is on principle impossible to classify morphologically specific organs or parts of the human body as belonging exclusively to one of these structures. Morphologically the human body and all its parts necessarily function equally in all four structures. (Thesis XII)

In the enkaptic structural whole of the human body Dooyeweerd distinguishes four substructures. These are hierarchically interlaced, such that the lower substructures are ‘morphologically bound’ to the higher substructures (Thesis X). The four substructures, from lower to higher, are these:

1. the physico-chemical substructure;
2. the biotic substructure;
3. the sensitive or psychical substructure;
4. the act structure.

About the physical substructure Dooyeweerd says:

In and by itself [this structure] is not yet a body structure, it is that only in its interlacement [vormgebondenheid, i.e., literally: it’s being morphologically bound] within the higher structures. In the process of decomposition of the body it is released to follow the laws proper to it. (Thesis XIII)

The second structure has a ‘typically biotic, so-called vegetative’ qualification (Thesis XIII). Within this structure living cells, tissues, organs and other biotically qualified structures occur. Dooyeweerd uses the term ‘vegetative’ to refer to the autonomic nervous system, among other things responsible for the regulation of breathing, heartbeat and perspiration, insofar these are not influenced by psychical and other higher functions.  

Regarding the sensitive or psychical substructure Dooyeweerd is thinking of sensory awareness, temperament, emotion and affective expression. Elsewhere he speaks of an ‘animal’ structure that receives its typically human destination only through its being bound within the act structure. These are processes that in their typical directedness are determined by the ‘sensory feeling function’ and ‘within certain limits fall outside control by the human will’ (Thesis XIII).

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13 This addition is important, because meanwhile we know how greatly the regulation of breathing, heartbeat and transpiration is influenced by learning processes, emotions and concentrated attention. Research in the 1960s indicated that directing attention inwards increases the heartbeat, while directing the attention outside oneself results in a lower pulse. Very well known is Pavlov’s experiment at the beginning of the previous century, in which he succeeded to stimulate salivating in dogs by association of stimuli; after a number of successive food offerings in combination with an auditory stimulus (a bell), it proved sufficient that the bell sounded for the dog to salivate. The interlacement of the biotic (salivating) and the psychical (learning processes) substructures, then, is very strong.

14 The term ‘animal’ appears in NC II, 114 (note): ‘I have argued that the act-structure of inner human experience is founded in a lower structure qualified by feeling-drives in which the psychical aspect has not yet opened its anticipatory spheres.... This animal structure is bound by the higher act-structure of human experience’ (italics mine). Nevertheless, it should be clear that Dooyeweerd here points to the psychical substructure in the narrower sense, apart from the typically human disclosure of this structure through anticipating subject-object relations.
The three substructures just mentioned can however only be understood as substructures of the human body through their structural interlacement with and disclosure by a fourth and highest structure, the act structure (Theses X and XI). The implications of this hierarchical organization become clear as we read on in Thesis XI:

When the three lower structures are considered in their specific internal nature and lawfulness outside [i.e. apart from] their bond with the fourth or highest structure, they cannot yet be understood as typical substructures of the human body. It is only in their successive interlacements with the fourth or highest structure that they become essential parts of the enkaptic structural whole called ‘human body’. In consequence of this enkaptic arrangement of the body, to the degree that the highest structure in the structural whole temporarily ceases to play its leading role, the lower [structures] will also manifest themselves outwardly [i.e. as separate], in accordance with the law proper to them. (Compare for example the temporary rule of the passions when rational deliberation is momentarily absent). (Thesis XI)

Dooyeweerd does not say that the enkaptic structural whole falls apart, as it does at death (compare his comment concerning the physical substructure). During an eruption of emotions the leading role of the highest structure is temporarily non-active.

Dooyeweerd adds the following to his description of the act life:

In the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea ‘acts’ are all performances [verrichtingen] that proceed from the human soul (or spirit), but function within the enkaptic structural whole of the human body, whereby human beings, led by normative points of view, direct themselves intentionally to states of affairs in reality or the world of their imagination, and innerly appropriate these intended states of affairs by relating them to their selfhood.

The act life of human beings manifests itself in the three basic directions [grondrichtingen] of knowing, imagining and willing which, because they mesh perfectly, must not be isolated into separate ‘faculties’.

The innerness of the ‘act’ is given with the intentional character of the act. The performance [ultimately] actualizes the intention of the act, whereby the acts of knowing, imagining and willing are interlaced in the motivated process of decision making and the decision is transformed into the deed. (Thesis XIV)

Acts, then, are not deeds as visible events; they are inner, characteristically intentional performances. Human act life functions as a kind of intermediary between the human soul (or selfhood, see below) and states of affairs in the outer world (or in the imagination). Acts proceed from the selfhood and focus on ‘something’ in the outside world in order to interiorize it, to make it one’s own.

The act structure comprises all modalities higher than the psychical (from the logical to the pistical). The subject functions of all these modalities are disclosed by the act structure.

Concerning the term ‘basic direction’ I note that this expression is turned against so-called faculty psychology, which isolated knowing, imagining (or feeling) and willing as separate capacities. Dooyeweerd speaks of basic
directions to emphasize the mutual interlacement of thinking, imagining and willing, an interlacement that ultimately rests on the fact that basic directions and acts are ‘rooted’ in the human heart and directed at a temporal horizon of meaning that encompasses all modal aspects.\textsuperscript{15}

3. Intermezzo: The enkaptic structural whole and the anthropological debate

To assess Dooyeweerd’s anthropology we need to pay attention to his doctrine of the heart as integral centre of human existence. But before I do so, I want to sketch Dooyeweerd’s position in the anthropological debate. Major points of difference with approaches discussed above (Section 2) are the mind–body problem and the distinction between man and animal. I leave for later the critical notes on Dooyeweerd’s own account (see Section 4.c).

The first thing to strike us is the elegant way in which the doctrine of the enkaptic structural whole escapes the usual objections to psycho-physical monism and psycho-physical dualism alike. Against monism these objections relate especially to its inherent \textit{reductionism}. No matter whether this monism is a version of materialism, idealism or identity theory, in every instance one specific functional mode is put centre stage (the physical, the psychical or a functional mode basic to both), at the cost of the independence and specificity of other functional modes. In other words, monism violates the principle of sphere sovereignty. For dualism things are no different, except that here two functional modes are absolutized rather than one. The consequence of such absolutizing is loss of structural \textit{coherence} and \textit{integration} of functions (or: modal aspects). Turning red in the face is then considered as a separate component or as a causal effect of anger. Neither version — parallelism and interactionism — really solves the problem of the inner coherence of turning red and being angry.\textsuperscript{16} Dooyeweerd’s theory of the enkaptic structural whole does, because it leads us to attend to the \textit{plural nature} of human corporeality (contra reductionist monism) and to the \textit{coherence} of the body functions (contra dualism).\textsuperscript{17}

The substructures retain the quality proper to them because they conform to an inner structural principle (contra monism), but this functional specificity does not imply independence (contra dualism). The substructures continue to be interlaced within the totality of the body and derive their typically human character from the structure of that totality. Turning red in the face in anger

\textsuperscript{15} This way of phrasing allows Dooyeweerd (\textit{NC} II, 115) to distance himself from both behaviourism and psychologies that base themselves purely on inner subjective states (‘Erlebnisse’).

\textsuperscript{16} For an attempt to elaborate upon (and correct) Dooyeweerd’s view on emotion, see Glas (1989).

\textsuperscript{17} This is an elaboration of an idea underlying Dooyeweerd’s entire theory of individuality structures, i.e. the idea that many sciences, including biology and psychology, invariably tend to absolutize their function concept. The modal (functional) perspective is time and again exchanged for an (ontic) perspective in terms of entities, Dooyeweerd says. Functions are seen as quasi-entities having a life of their own. The inevitable consequence is that the coherence of functions becomes a problem. This ultimately results in either dualism (two functions made independent and placed over against each other) or some kind of monism (reduction of functions to just one).
tells us something about the whole of the person in a specific situation: he is indignant for example because he was insulted by some brutality. Many facets play a role in this: physiology (one person turns red sooner than another), temperament (one is excitable, another phlegmatic) and sensitivity to the nature of the insult. The total reaction embraces both the biotic substructure (turning red due to widening of the blood vessels) and the psychical substructure (the feeling of anger and the drive to express it). Turning red is not something separate and is not the result of something that exists separately (anger). It reveals something of the person, namely how angry he or she is. It is more than a purely biotic phenomenon, it is turning red in anger — which at the same time refers to anticipations within the biotic to psychical and higher object functions. Anger is not just a blind reaction. It arises on the basis of a specific feeling — which refers to anticipations within the psychical to higher object functions such as the capacity to distinguish (logical) the precise content of the insult, its implications for mutual relations (social) and its moral legitimacy (ethical).

Let me elaborate this with the help of another example. The function of the brain can be understood from the perspective of the biotically qualified substructure. From the biotic subject function of this substructure the biotic object functions are disclosed in the retrocipatory direction in the physical-chemical substructure and in spatial functioning — think for instance of the regulation of the membrane potential responsible for impulse conduction and stimulus transfer among neurons (nerve cells); and of the plasticity of the brain in virtue of which the biotic functions of the brain are not strictly linked to specific (spatially localized) nerve cells, because these functions can be taken over by other nerve cells. Moreover, in the biotic functioning of the brain object functions from higher law spheres are disclosed in an anticipating, hence analogical way. Put differently, when the brain is studied from the perspective of the biotic substructure we can say that in the functioning of the brain object functions from higher law spheres are being anticipated, by reason of the interlacement of the biotic substructure within higher-order structures. This disclosure (i.e.: anticipation within the biotic function of the brain on higher-order human functioning) contains a deepening and specification as well as a greater openness and potential variation. In consequence of this the

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18 For the sake of brevity I pass by the functioning of the brain within the physical substructure.

19 The phenomenon of plasticity, currently an item in neuroscience, cannot considered separate from the fact that in humans the biotic anticipates object functions in higher law spheres.

20 Ouweneel (1986, 202-206) speaks of activated internal object functions of a biotic animal structure (perceptive), a biotic mamal structure (sensitive), and a biotic human structure (spiritive). The distinction internal-external concerning object functions has to do with being part or not being part of the enkaptic structural whole. Activation of the aesthetic object function of the bird’s song does not proceed from the bird itself; it depends on the human (and is therefore external). In a singing human person this disclosure is internal. The terms ‘perceptive’ and ‘sensitive’ point to a distinction in the psychical: Ouweneel holds that elementary instances of awareness (perceptions) should be distinguished from feelings, tendencies and desires (the sensitive) (see IV.3.c). Ouweneel’s term ‘spiritive’ points to what Dooyeweerd calls act structure.
brain is preconditioned for human functioning in higher substructures. The psychical substructure for example discloses the brain in its quality of ‘organ’ of perception and feeling, while the act structure appeals to still other possible functions such as those that have to do with the planning and organization of behaviour.

New and challenging in this view is that it weans us away from the almost ineradicable habit of identifying the brain as concrete, morphologically determinable entity with the results of scientific research regarding the biotic function of the brain — so that mental processes appear as mysterious epiphenomena. The morphological delimitation, in tandem with the unqualified character of the term ‘brain’, aids and abets reification. Dooyeweerd puts a halt to such reification in three ways:

1. by the sharp distinction between the modal and the entitary point of view;
2. by the distinction between the law side and the subject -side of the substructures (subject side = that which is subject to the law);
3. finally, by denying these substructures any independence whatever by reason of their interlacement in the enkaptic structural whole, which in the case of humans is furthermore not bound to a specific (modal) function.

In practice this means that

Ad 1: in studying certain processes such as the regulation of mood, or word recognition, the function that qualifies the process must, as modal function, be distinguished from the process itself as totality, that is to say, as individuality structure;

Ad 2: in studying brain activity a sharp distinction must be made between the brain in its concrete functioning (subject side) and the functioning of the brain within the biotic substructure (law side);

Ad 3: the functioning of the brain cannot be limited to functioning within (only) one single substructure.

In short, brain processes must always be studied in terms of human functioning as a whole, that is, in terms of all of the four substructures. Every part of the body functions equally in all substructures, Dooyeweerd holds. I would add that human corporeality itself in turn also functions in a broader bio-psychosocial context. A fascinating example of this is how mood (and many kinds of hormonal processes) depends on the alternation of light and dark. When the bio-rhythm is disrupted it may cause people sleepless nights and make them moody, as anyone who ever experienced jet lag will confirm.

It is therefore justified to a degree, i.e. from the perspective of the whole of human corporeality, to speak of the brain as organ for thinking, perceiving, feeling and planning. Does that mean that the brain as such thinks, perceives, feels and plans — that the brain itself acts? It does not, Dooyeweerd says. It is always the ‘whole person in the unity of body and soul who performs “acts”’ (Thesis XX) (see Bennett and Hacker 2003 for a more recent reformulation of this
Where philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1949) asserts that feelings and behaviors cannot be attributed to a 'ghost in the machine', Dooyeweerd would agree. No mysterious, immaterial substance lurks in the tissue of the brain, no *homunculus* (little man) or subject. Even so — and here Dooyeweerd parts ways with philosophers like Ryle — the brain is more than a machine or a computer. The brain does not itself function as subject, it is no acting agent, but this does not mean that it has no subject functions in substructures higher than the biotic substructure. We have to keep in mind the difference between subject and subject function. People are 'subject' in the sense of actor only in the totality of their functioning; in contrast, 'subject functions' are always functions of substructures and entities. We can attribute subject functions higher than the biotic to the brain, namely insofar as it is studied in terms of a substructure higher than the biotic (the psychical substructure and the act structure).

This runs counter to prevalent intuitions because the term 'brain' tends to be used in an unqualified way, while at the same time the unspoken assumption is that the functioning of the brain is primarily biotic. Dooyeweerd would say that the functional (modal) perspective is exchanged for an entitary point of view, while moreover this view erroneously identifies the lawful functioning of the brain with its concrete functioning (subject side). 'Brain' is the flag hiding the cargo of a 'reified complex of functions'. If we look closely though, the description of a given brain function is always from a specific perspective, be it in modal terms or as entity. This is particularly the case in the special sciences.

As I see it, Dooyeweerd's approach is of great value for both the mind–brain debate and for the comparison of human and animal. As to the mind–brain issue: the very posing of the problem already suggests that 'mind' and 'brain' are reified into separate 'functional complexes'. Things are no different in the currently popular thought-experiments in the philosophy of mind. Brains are transplanted, bodies transmitted to other planets, minds split or doubled via computer copies. All of these versions however suffer from begging the question by starting out as if the functional coherence between body, brain and

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21 Note that Dooyeweerd introduces still another element in the discussion, namely, that in human act life the soul (or heart) is operative as well. I leave this for now in order to underscore again the point at issue, that is, that the brain — and thus actually every organ of the human body — functions equally in each of the four substructures.

22 An example may help to illustrate this point. The scientist who investigates the neuro-hormonal regulation of mood should ask whether this inquiry concerns mostly the area of the biotic substructure, for example in the case of molecular-biological study of receptor changes; or whether the inquiry is in the area of the psychical substructure, for example in the case of various types of mood changes due to (pharmacological) manipulation at receptor level. In the first case the mood regulation comes into (anticipatory) view as psychical object function within the biotic substructure. In the second case we are dealing with a biotic subject function within the psychical substructure (or as biotic object in the psychical modal function). The problem in this sort of research is that the two perspectives alternate, and so easily lead to a short-circuit. Mood changes are then causally attributed to neuronal processes. In terms of Dooyeweerd’s system this attribution implies a double short-circuit: modal and in terms of entities. The principle of (modal) sphere sovereignty does not allow causality between functional modes (it does allow coherence). The idea of foundational enkapsis allows no causality between substructures. It does allow coherence and integration within a structural whole. Compare Glas (1991, Chapter 6) and Glas (2001, Chapter 4).
spirit can be broken — after all, they are just thought-experiments — while the real problem of the structural coherence is suspended. These experiments do tell us something about how we think of the body, the brain and the spirit, but tell us nothing about the intrinsic coherence of the biotic and the mental in the functioning of the brain.

As to the comparison of human and animal: In Dooyeweerd’s system the animal is an enkaptic structural whole with the psychical substructure as the highest substructure. The animal lacks part of the focusing, specifying and disclosing of the lower substructures by higher substructures that is so characteristic of humans. According to Dooyeweerd there can therefore be no planning and organization in the true sense (inner deliberation, reciprocity). The purposefulness which animals evince in their behaviour is bound to the biotic (procreation) and the instinctive (survival, physical security). The same is true of the ‘social’ interactions among animals — such as interactions involving dominance and submission, and to obtain sexual partners. To apply ethological models to human social and moral functioning will leave much that is characteristically human out of consideration, although Dooyeweerd’s system does allow parallels being drawn. The social interaction among humans can close in upon itself and become dominated by the laws of physical survival and the ‘right’ of the strongest. But the awareness that in such situations humanity is not done justice tells us that this is an anti-normative development. To be truly human involves more, reciprocity for example, and care and neighbourly love. Dooyeweerd’s system can do justice to both the structural differences and the structural similarities between humans and animals.

4. The heart as spiritual centre of the human being

Much indeed has been written about Dooyeweerd’s teaching of the supra-temporal heart. The doctrine has met with passionate adherents and fervent antagonists. I restrict myself here to a sketch of the main points of view and their place within Dooyeweerd’s entire system and their significance for the current discussion in philosophical anthropology.

As is clear from the above, the doctrine of the human body as enkaptic structural whole is not the ultimate characterization of being human. A special danger here is that the structural whole, in spite of all its internal differentiation, will too easily be understood as closed and self-sufficient. I noted earlier that for Dooyeweerd the act structure is open and modally undetermined. Even so, the danger of substantialization, in this case of the body as form-totality, is not quite overcome. In fact, this is one of the reasons why Dooyeweerd introduces the notion of the ‘heart’ as spiritual centre of the human being, a centre that points beyond itself.

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23 This is not to say that these thought-experiments are complete nonsense. In a humorous address, published later, Dennett (1981, 310-323) shows that it is possible, unavoidable even, to raise certain moral and juridical issues in a physicalist framework of thinking.

24 For a thorough and accurate exposition and defence, see Ouweneel (1986, Chapters 5, 6). For a critique see Steen (1983). In his opposition Steen uses Dooyeweerd’s own conceptual tools to point to traces of the nature-grace motive in Dooyeweerd’s thought.
The crucial point here is that in Dooyeweerd the question of man is in essence a religious question. This is also true of Heschel, cited in the Introduction above. Dooyeweerd puts it this way:

Where Scripture speaks of the human soul or spirit in the pregnant religious sense, it invariably refers to it as the heart of all temporal existence from which proceed all issues of temporal life. Nowhere does Scripture teach a dichotomy between a ‘rational soul’ and a ‘material body’ in temporal existence; this temporal existence as a whole is the body, laid down at death. In contrast, the human spirit or soul as religious root of the body is, according to Scriptural revelation, not subjected to temporal death (though subjected to eternal death apart from Jesus Christ), because it indeed transcends [te boven gaan] all things temporal. This revelation concerning the ‘soul’ of human existence as integral centre of the whole of corporeality, is entirely correlate with the Self-Revelation of God as integral Creator of heaven and earth, who has no autonomous power against Him. This revelation concerning human nature is not at all an ‘anthropology’ or scientific theory of human existence. Rather, it is the religious presupposition on which all genuinely Christian anthropology should be founded. (Thesis V)

And a little further on Dooyeweerd says that

[The human soul] is beyond all scientific understanding because it is the presuppositum of all conceiving. Knowledge concerning the soul is religious self-knowledge and genuine self-knowledge is possible only through genuine knowledge of God from Divine Word-revelation. (Thesis VI)

These quotations make it abundantly clear that for Dooyeweerd the question of man is a religious one. Moreover, this view is not an ideological frosting applied to the cake of structural theory. For Dooyeweerd matters are far more basic. Self-knowledge is religious in nature and this fact is inscribed in the very nature of human existence as such. Self-knowledge is intrinsically bound up with the concentration of existence in a ‘self’ and with the orientation of this self towards the true (or supposed) Origin of meaning. Concerning this orientation Dooyeweerd speaks of an ‘innate impulse’.25 This innate impulse denotes the religious response side of human existence and is the expression of man as the image of God. In the order of treatment, therefore, the idea of the heart as spiritual centre precedes theory of structure.

Many themes from Dooyeweerd’s thinking are present here in compressed form: the thesis of the radical non-self-sufficiency of the creature (a human being is not an ‘autonomous counterpart’); the strong association between on the one hand differentiation and temporality and on the other hand unity and supra-temporality; the (Kantian) distinction between (scientific) concept and (transcendental religious) idea; the relation between self-knowledge and knowledge of God (inspired by the opening sentences of Calvin’s Institutes and prominently present in Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique); and, finally, the thought that religion involves human existence as a whole and not just one of its aspects, such as the function of faith (pistis).

25 The expression ‘innate impulse’ is derived from Dooyeweerd’s definition of religion in NC I, 57: “the innate impulse of human selfhood to direct itself toward the true or toward a pretended absolute Origin of all temporal diversity of meaning, which it finds focused concentrically in itself.”
Accordingly, the fundamental problem of anthropology can be stated in the following question:

How can temporal human existence with its theoretically extrapolated [uiteen-gestelde, i.e. artificially isolated] aspects and individuality structures nevertheless be understood as a deeper whole and a deeper unity? (Thesis VII)

The concentration of existence in the heart as spiritual centre is not an act of conscious willing or thinking. It is a presuppositum, that is, something that must be assumed the moment one begins to think about the human person. Structure, in the sense of coherence of substructures in a larger whole, and dynamism, in the sense of religious concentration towards the Origin, go hand-in-hand here. Dooyeweerd is actually saying that the unity of human existence can be understood only in terms of the religious dynamism of this existence. In this dynamism human existence points beyond itself to the Creator of all that is. Denial of this pointing-beyond-itself as anthropological presuppositum inevitably leads to some form of dualism or monism. In the restlessness of existence human beings seek a hold or footing, an origin of meaning. And this hold is usually found in something in temporal reality — in thinking, or in human biological nature. This 'something' is then seen as something 'an sich', in itself, and so substantialized. The result of this is that the coherence between the substructures is lost and that a specific aspect of human functioning is one-sidedly highlighted.

In the 'Theses' Dooyeweerd focuses mostly on the traditional dualism between anima rationalis (rational soul) and material body. The idea of the rational soul basically rests on substantialization of the logical function of thought. In this connection Aristotle speaks of an active and incorruptible principle of thought. This principle, as the general origin of thought acts, enters the human soul from without. Dooyeweerd sees this dualism returning in thinkers like Husserl and Scheler, who describe the acts as non-corporeal, intentional perceptions. These thinkers oppose the selfhood, as ‘personal centre living purely in its acts’ (Thesis XV), to human corporeality. This dualism also rests on a substantialization of the logical function.

26 In more contemporary idiom this is the central point in Hart’s (1984, 279, 318) reflection on man as well. The spirit is not something extra, above or outside the body, it is neither more nor less than the whole of corporeality viewed in terms of origin and destination of man and world. The unity of the human being is the expression of this dynamism in human development.

27 Thesis XVII: “The anima rationalis invariably proves to be the product of a theoretical abstraction from the full, temporal (hence corporeal) existence of humans, and this abstraction is subsequently understood as referring to a substance that is essentially independent of the material body.” Compare Glas (1992).

28 Thesis XVI: “Aristotle’s definitive conception of the anima rationalis as the ‘body in action’ clearly shows that Aristotle must have held thinking and willing to be conscious performances on the part of the anima rationalis. He could not consistently develop this important insight however, because the Greek form–matter theme demanded that at least the general principle of thinking (as rational form principle) be understood as a substance (ousia) wholly independent of the ‘material body’. Because of this Aristotle could only conceive of the faculty of receptive human thought (thought as dynamis) as part of the human soul, but not the actual thinking activity (nous poietikos), understood to be the ‘form of the body’.”
As noted, for Dooyeweerd the acts are part of corporeality. In Husserl and Scheler this insight cannot be done justice because they model their definition of the act life after the act of theoretical knowing, i.e. as being involved with a purely intentional Gegenstand. The term ‘Gegenstand’ here does not refer to a state of affairs in the outside world; it refers to the object as it presents itself in our consciousness. Particularly for Husserl, knowledge arises when a thinking I directs itself to an object of thought. According to Dooyeweerd however, when acts are conceived after the model of the theoretical act of thought, two points are overlooked:

1) “that the Gegenstand relation is not present at all in non-theoretical acts, and

2) that even in the theoretical act of thinking, it is not the act itself, but only its logical aspect that is placed over against the pre-logical body aspects, and that this Gegenstand relation is but the product of an intended abstraction from the total, actual act of knowing.” (Thesis XV)

Dualism, then, is unavoidable when human act life is viewed as incorporeal. However, we might ask, is the problem not repeated in Dooyeweerd himself when he distinguishes between supra-temporal soul and temporal body? To be sure, the act life is considered corporeal, but does this not merely move up the problem? After all, how are we to understand the relation between the soul and the acts?

Surely, these questions show that the characterization given above of the soul (or heart) as centre pointing-beyond-itself in which all of human existence is concentrated, still needs elaboration. But first it should be emphasized again that we must rid ourselves of any notion of the heart as a ‘thing’; and even more of the heart as a ‘thing in itself’ or as reified substance. The heart is the dynamical source from which all human activity originates. It not a thing, nor does it have a ‘thing-structure’. Therefore, it cannot be grasped in theoretical terms. If this were the case a dualism between supra-temporal heart and corporeality would be unavoidable. However, Dooyeweerd repeatedly points out that the heart can only be understood in a religious sense. Terms like ‘religious’ and ‘religion’ do not refer to something ‘before us’, an activity or process we can think about and that can be objectified in a theoretical sense. We have religion always in our back, so to say. We cannot go behind it. The term religion refers to an essential characteristic or fundamental longing of existence itself. What holds for religion is also applicable to the notion of the heart. The heart is not a concept that can be defined scientifically; it is no construct with a specific empirical content. The term heart signifies a tendency, a dynamism that can in no way be delimited conceptually, because, according to Dooyeweerd, it underlies all conceptualization and is its presupposition.29 Philosophy can only

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29 This is why Dooyeweerd calls the heart (in the philosophical sense) an idea. The distinction between concept and idea derives from Kant. In Kant ideas have a regulative significance. They have no empirical content, but have a formative effect in the process of acquiring knowledge. The ideas direct scientific knowing to that which lies on the other side of the knowing consciousness: the essentially unknowable reality of the ‘Ding-an-sich’. Dooyeweerd gives this
indicate this dynamism tentatively, gropingly, though in close harmony with Scriptural revelation on this point.

In virtue of the radical religious qualification of theoretical thought every philosophical anthropology rests on an idea of the human soul; the transcendental (i.e. making theoretical inquiry possible) character of this idea also determines the entire philosophical approach to the structure of the human body. (Thesis VIII)

When this founding thought is neglected philosophical thinking degenerates into metaphysics, that is, into philosophical-conceptual articulation (and substantialization) of that which essentially escapes philosophical analysis.

It is only when this basic insight is appropriated that it becomes clear that in a true sense there can be no ‘relationship’ between the soul (the heart) and the acts. A relationship requires that there be two or more independent relata, while the soul just happens to be no such independent relatum. But if we cannot grasp the heart as a conceptually identifiable principle more or less causally operational in the act life, then how should we understand the relation (to use the word and quickly forget it) between the soul and the act life? Dooyeweerd’s answer to this question shows that, next to the mentioned tendencies of focusing and pointing-beyond-itself, there is a third characteristic that can be attributed to the heart, namely, that it expresses itself in the corporeal mode of existence.

The undifferentiated character of the act structure of the human body is inseparably related to its function as plastic field of expression of the human spirit in its Scriptural, religious sense. For, this spirit on principle transcends all temporal structures of life; consequently it must express itself bodily in all possible differentiated structures. Every differentiated individuality structure confers on the processes performed within it a typically rigid delimitation. The human spirit however is in religious freedom in command of his bodily field of expression, which must therefore possess the greatest possible plasticity. Hence also, the human body, which only takes on its typically human character in the act structure, is given a spiritual faculty of expression, essentially lacking in the animal body in its rigid delimitation by a psychically qualified structure. (Thesis XXII)

In short, the spirit (soul, heart) is not ‘something’ apart from the act life; it is utterly interwoven with that act life and thus with the body. The act structure itself functions as ‘plastic field of expression’ of the human spirit. And the human body itself has the ‘faculty of spiritual expression’. The whole of human existence is compressed in the heart, but at the same time the heart is expressed in the whole of existence. Being-human, we might paraphrase Dooyeweerd, is a spiritual breathing in and breathing out, concentration and divergence. This is why it is

the whole human being in the unity of soul and body who performs the ‘acts’, and outside of the body no acts in their temporal structure are possible. In other

interpretation of the (transcendental) ideas a religious twist, that is, he views the ideas as necessary religious presuppositions for knowing.
words, the acts should be conceived neither as purely spiritual nor as purely corporeal. (Thesis XX)

Note that Dooyeweerd does not say here that the act structure should be understood both spiritually and corporeally, but that the acts should. The act structure is and remains a body structure. It is a philosophical-scientific term and refers — and can only refer — to structures of temporal reality. The actual body in its acts is however characterized by the mutual permeation of the spiritual and the corporeal.

Again we note that Dooyeweerd’s views are surprisingly to the point, even in the context of current anthropological debates. Think for example of the theme of personal identity. As we saw, discussions on this theme are in part determined by the demise of the philosophy-of-consciousness-inspired determination of the I (or selfhood), in part by a variety of naturalistic alternatives. The approach by the philosophy of consciousness encountered the problem of infinite regression and that of quasi-objectification and its concomitant loss of the relation with the self. In questioning back to the I behind the ‘I think’, the I paled into a vague theoretical term. From the Dooyeweerdian point of view it could be said that this is not surprising, because this self-reflexive determination of the self begins from a theoretical abstraction: consciousness is severed from its corporeal, emotional and social embeddedness and constructed as a consciousness that is located (and substantialized) within the confines of a purely immaterial realm. From this position the I–self relation can only be modelled after the epistemological subject–object relation, entirely conceived of as within the limits of consciousness, i.e. as a relation between a (transcendental) ego and its (inner) thoughts and perceptions. In the framework of such abstraction no justice can be done to the self-relatedness of humans in a full sense, i.e., to the fact that who I am concerns me emotionally and existentially.

In the Dooyeweerdian perspective there can be genuine self-involvement only when the ‘ego-ism’ of the self-reflexive philosophy of consciousness is broken up and the heart is seen as the expression of the fullness of being and as oriented to the Creator. To be human is to answer to the tendency towards the Origin which causes the whole of existence to point beyond itself. Self-involvement does not come into its own until the human being is understood as homo respondens, as a being who finds its destiny in hearing and responding to the appeal of the Creator and Redeemer (see also Geertsema 1992).

Indirectly this also clarifies Dooyeweerd’s objection to the various naturalistic views of the self. Even apart from the evident fact that these views lack the idea of pointing-beyond-itself (transcendence), we must conclude that they spell scientific reductionism. Dennett called the ‘self’ an abstraction, a cognitive illusion arising because people have the incorrigible habit of assuming that behind the web of self-interpretations there is a Dictator (or I) in his Headquarters (consciousness). This certainly circumvents the danger of substantialization of the I, but the price is high: one can no longer speak of an ego or selfhood in a real sense. And the question of responsibility for one’s actions becomes a very difficult one.
The above considerations clarify Dooyeweerd’s objections to two major currents in the debate on personal identity: a rationalistic metaphysics that views the ‘ego’ as substance; and a naturalistic empiricism which considers the ego as at best a helpful mental construct or cognitive illusion. These objections, however, do not take away all obscurities with respect to Dooyeweerd’s own position. Is it possible to give a positive account of personal identity, if the ‘I’ is not a thing, nor an illusion? Does the theory of the supra-temporal heart solve all problems with respect to human identity? Unfortunately, Dooyeweerd has remained largely silent on these points. So, the next account is a brief extrapolation on my own account on what Dooyeweerd could have said with respect these questions.

To begin with, one can consider Dooyeweerd’s view on the structure of things and their identity. With respect to things, one can ask what it is that makes a thing both unique and identifiable (something that is and remains what it is). Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the experience of identity escapes science. This experience is bound to daily life. Things and people appear in it as a continuous stream of ‘individual wholes’ that, though always changing, continue to be distinguishable and hence identifiable. Because the experience of identity is bound to daily life we cannot conceive of identity apart from individuality. The converse is true as well: we gain awareness of individuality only against the background of certain constants (or structural principles). This is why Dooyeweerd speaks of a ‘strict correlation of law side and subject side’. The identity of a thing is a ‘subjective-individual’ identity. In other words, identity belongs to the existence of a thing as ‘subject’ (to the law). But this subjective-individual identity is simultaneously determined by the law side, namely in virtue of the internal structural principle of the thing. Concerning the identity of a thing, then, Dooyeweerd distinguishes a structural and an individual aspect, corresponding with the law side (structural principle) and the subject side (being individual as subject). These two aspects should never be seen as divorced because in daily experience law side and subject side are always given together.

Next, let us consider human beings. Humans differ from other structural wholes by reason of their acts and the act structure. In other words, humans derive their identity not only from their existence as numerical (I consist of one not two persons), spatial (I am somewhere in space), kinematic (my existence has continuity), physical (I exist materially), biotic (I am born, I grow, I die) and psychical (I experience). Humans recognize and find their unique identity also, and especially, in acts and activities for which the principles of modalities higher than the psychical are regulative. Here again we meet the correlation of law side and subject side, of normative principles (structural aspect) and the response to these (subjective-individual aspect). We can say, therefore, that a human being exists as response, as answer. Such answering does not begin from an empty slate, a tabula rasa, and does not take place in a vacuum. One’s becoming also depends on constitution, aptitude and circumstance. In the course of life certain constancies become visible; think of character, the various dispositions, and the role of memory in the organization of
experienced life events and actual behaviour. All of these factors contribute to the development of personal identity, an identity that, in its many-sidedness and its multiple meanings, is both unique and continuous.

Because identity is shaped in the course of life (that is, because it has a historical or disclosing dimension), it makes sense to distinguish between the I and the self. The I would refer to the dynamism and actuality of existence as answer; the self would refer to the more or less durable results of such answering, in the form of mimetic and motor dispositions, mood, character traits, social roles, juridical position, attitude to life and awareness of calling. Ultimately, however, human identity is not exhausted in this manifold of characteristics (the self), nor in the actual answers (the I). Ultimately, who I am is a secret, a mystery that has to do with the fact that ‘I’ am never congruent with my ‘self’. I relate myself to myself and others, and so answer to my deepest origin and destination. In both the Old and the New Testament this mystery is bound up with my having a name. It is a mystery secured in Jesus Christ, because it is He who binds his name to ours, and confesses our name before the Father and his angels (Rev. 3:5; Isa 56:5; 65:15; Rev. 2:17; 3:12).

IV. Other thinkers in the reformational tradition

1. Some main lines

The fundamental questions in anthropology are closely linked to those in cosmology. The outbreak of debate among Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven and their students in the 1950s is a case in point. Much of the discussion relates to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy of time, and especially to his teaching of the supratemporality of the heart. These are difficult matters that easily give rise to misunderstandings, even among adherents of the first hour. I will focus on those aspects of the debate where new anthropological views are introduced. For a more extensive commentary I refer to Ouweneel’s thesis.

A second area that should be mentioned is the confrontation with the Philosophy of Existence and the theology influenced by it (Karl Barth). However interesting and profound the various contributions may be, space here does not allow me to pursue this track. In the last section I will discuss some new (provisional) systematic approaches.

2. Discussion concerning the supratemporality of the heart

Before I comment on the discussions about the supratemporality of the heart it should be pointed out once more that Dooyeweerd’s anthropology was meant, first of all, to be an anti-dualistic anthropology. Among those who have affinity with this philosophy this intention is now hardly questioned — in spite

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Examples of this are: van der Hoeven (1963); Mekkes (1965), (1971), (1973); Zuidema (1948; 1972). This latter work contains essays on Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Dewey, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Blondel, Marcel, Ricoeur, Barth and Bultmann.
of some Anglo-Saxon suggestions tending towards dualism (Cooper 1989). This consensus may now be rather self-evident, but it was everything but self-evident in the 1920s and 1930s. It is difficult today to picture how great a battle the combating of the body-soul dualism was. From the days of the Reformation right up until at least the middle of the twentieth century this dualism constituted mainstream protestant thinking.

It must have been all the more painful for Dooyeweerd that many students and kindred minds espied a kind of dualism in his doctrine of the supra-temporal heart. It can actually be said that the whole debate on the problem of time amounted to an extended and simultaneously decisive off-shoot of this anthropological debate.

Let us then, guided by Vollenhoven, consider the coherence of anthropological and cosmological problems. Next we pay attention to some new themes that arise in this connection, such as the themes of evil, the relation between religious self-knowledge and transcendental presuppositions, and the problem of the I-self relation. Finally, I comment on Cooper’s defence of the body-soul dualism.

(a) Vollenhoven

Vollenhoven never did devote a separate study to anthropology. The reason why I nevertheless highlight the insights of this founding father is that his work shows that subtle differences of insight into basic questions can lead to an incisively different approach in anthropology. These differences of insight are particularly related to the place of the soul in the light of the triad God-law-cosmos, and to Vollenhoven’s different understanding of time and history.

For Vollenhoven, an essential characteristic of history is change, rather than diversity as it is in Dooyeweerd’s thought. Time is not — as it is in the case of the cosmic order of time in Dooyeweerd — the all-embracing framework within which change occurs, and even less is it the necessary condition for change to occur at all. On the contrary, both time and history are part and parcel of creation; both are ‘under’, i.e. subject to, the law.

Vollenhoven does not deny that the various modalities are related to time, but this relatedness is by way of things (including plants, animals, humans). To ‘modalize’ time, casu quo Dooyeweerd’s view that modalities are functions of time, is to attribute too much independence or autonomy to the functions. Neither should history be understood as a function or modality. From the systematic point of view history is a topic to be treated in the context of the doctrine of the realms or kingdoms. History is not an attribute of an abstraction.

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31 For an important (Neo-Thomist) defense of mind-body dualism, see Moreland and Rae (2000).

32 The argument counter to these two interpretations (time as comprehensive framework; time as necessary condition) is that thought would be able to encompass the effective drive of reality c.q. history. Human thinking cannot however link up in such ways with that which is outside of reality c.q. history. Both of these are ultimately determined by the triad God-law-cosmos, that is to say, by the human response to the command of creation, love and responsibility. This response is historical. See Vollenhoven (1992a), especially the scheme on page 184; and Vollenhoven (1992b).
called 'man'; history is indissolubly bound to the ventures and vicissitudes of the human realm as distinct from the realm of plants or the animal kingdom, which are caught up in a process of becoming but have no history.

This is enough to see why Vollenhoven has great difficulty with Dooyeweerd’s notion of the supra-temporality of the heart, and even looks upon it as a possible point of entry for a dualistic anthropology. Actually, Vollenhoven says, Dooyeweerd locates the soul between God and creation as a kind of connecting link. Just as time and history, however, the soul is subject to the law.\(^{35}\)

Still, this does not mean that the soul can be located in one of the functions. The heart should be understood in a pre-functional, rather than functional sense. The heart is the hub, the pre-functional centre of the so-called 'function cloak' (the fourteen known aspects).\(^{34}\) The background of this stance is that Vollenhoven, in this respect in agreement with Dooyeweerd, sees the heart as centre of choice, of choice of direction. It is as direction-choosing centre that the heart determines all of human functioning. In his philosophical system, then, Vollenhoven treats the heart as third qualification or determinant of creation, the determination via the opposition or antithesis of good and evil.\(^{35}\)

Vollenhoven engaged in an intense struggle with anthropological problems and was intensively in contact concerning these matters with A. Janse, school-master in Biggekerke, a small village in Zeeland province, who in the 1920s and 1930s developed a view with remarkable affinity (Janse 1938).\(^{36}\) Prior to 1920 Vollenhoven’s conception was still coloured by the traditional ontology (theory of being) and the classical body–soul dualism (Kok 1992, 37-43). Soon however, one would be hard pressed to find a more redoubtable opponent of ontologizing approaches than Vollenhoven. Even the formulation of 'pointing beyond itself' — which, as we saw, is one of the characteristics of Dooyeweerd’s anthropology — seems to Vollenhoven to retain too much of an old (Aristotelian) ontology. In his dependence man does not point beyond himself; rather, he ‘reaches out’ and crosses the threshold of ‘the throne-hall of God’ (Vollenhoven 1992a, 186). In Vollenhoven this reaching out is a genuinely transcending activity, not an ‘ontic’ pointing-beyond-itself.\(^{37}\) It is likely that this

\(^{33}\) At issue here is Dooyeweerd’s cosmology as anthropocentric. Apparently, Vollenhoven accords a less central place to humans in the whole of creation than Dooyeweerd. Actually, Dooyeweerd, other than Vollenhoven tends to suggest, would not deny that the soul is subject to law. The supra-temporal sphere as such, too, is subject to law. For Dooyeweerd supra-temporality is not supra-creation and eternity is created eternity (aevum). Vollenhoven is correct however in saying that in Dooyeweerd’s thought the entire temporal reality is focused on the Origin of meaning via the supra-temporal heart.

\(^{34}\) The term 'function(al) cloak' is probably derived from Paul’s term ‘earthly tent’ in 2 Cor. 5:1-4.

\(^{35}\) The first ‘determination’ is the ‘such–no’ distinction (which is modal), the second ‘determination’ is the ‘this–that’ distinction (entitary). See Vollenhoven (1967, 22ff, 53ff).

\(^ {36}\) Regarding this struggle and the communications with Janse, see Stellingwerff (1992, 60-65).

\(^{37}\) Dooyeweerd does indeed speak of actual transcending of cosmic time. In the well-known note in NC I, 31-32, in reaction to the ‘Divergentierapport I’ written by Vollenhoven and circulating among board members of the Association for Calvinistic Philosophy, he writes: “(...) Some seek the concentration-point of human existence in time and suppose, that this religious centre must certainly be pre-functional but not supra-temporal. But, at least within the horizon of cosmic time we have no single experience of something ‘pre-functional’, i.e.
resistance to every possible type of ontologizing explains why Vollenhoven restricts his analysis of the human being to the duality pre-functional heart–function cloak, and that he does not, like Dooyeweerd, let the analysis of thing-structures apply to anthropology (in the form of substructures, enkaptically interlaced into a whole). One suspects, even if he is nowhere explicit about this, that Vollenhoven espied too much substantialization in the teaching of substructures.

(b) Evil and transience [vergankelijkheid]: K.J. Popma

Dooyeweerd links time primarily to (modal) diversity. Vollenhoven, as we saw, equals time and change. In K.J. Popma we meet with still another accent: time as (mark of) transience. Popma’s publications testify to a strong fascination with this theme. Time and again we find passages dealing with tiredness, weariness, old age, illness and physical decay.38 This preoccupation cannot be understood in isolation from his views on the problem of time.39

One of the questions raised by Popma is: How can philosophy do justice to the biblical view that the believer’s eternal life commences even prior to death, without having recourse to a dualism between eternity and time, between an imperishable and a transient part in a human being?40 Popma (1965, 251-252) answers as follows:

...of anything that would transcend the modal diversity of the aspects. We gain this experience only in the religious concentration of the radix of our existence upon the absolute Origin. In this concentration we transcend cosmic time. How could man direct himself toward eternal things, if eternity were not ‘set in his heart’? Even the idolatrous absolutizing of the temporal cannot be explained from the temporal horizon of human existence. For the latter nowhere provides a point of contact for an idea of the absolute, unless it be related apriori to the supra-temporal. This act of concentration presupposes a supra-temporal starting-point in our consciousness.

This, however, is not to say that the religious centre of human existence is found in a rigid and static immobility. That is a metaphysical-Greek idea of supra-temporality."

Reading this passage we should realize that Dooyeweerd’s notion of time refers to cosmic time, which is related to modal diversity (and coherence) rather than transience. This is the reason why Dooyeweerd cannot but say that the unity of existence can only be grasped by transcending temporal diversity. So, we can conclude that the difference between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven with respect to the supra-temporality of the heart depends on different views on time and the cosmic time order. Vollenhoven’s rejection of the notion of cosmic time order and his exclusion of numerical and spatial modal qualifications from the notion of time-order ‘would even spell a regress in face of the view of Kant’ and also in the face of the mathematician Hamilton and of the intuitionist school in mathematics, according to Dooyeweerd (NCI, 31-32, note 1). For a discussion of the ‘Divergentierapport’, see Tol and Bril (1992, 107-11).

38 See Popma (1963), especially the chapters on illness and sin, and aging and old age, and Popma (1962, 75ff) on brainwashing.

39 Popma wrote no less than three books on this topic and in his other writings, too, the theme often returns (see Popma 1945, 1965, 1972). See also ‘Het onaantastbare in ons’ in Popma (1963, 291-311). Popma was a theologian. He wrote in essay style, tending to improvisation. He often meditated extensively on biblical passages. His writings are characteristically spirited and reflexively philosophical.

40 Regarding this Biblical teaching consider for example texts such as “Truly, truly, I say to you, he who believes has eternal life” (John 6:47), also 6:40 and 6:54, and “And this is eternal life, that they know thee the only true God…” (John 17:3).
In connection to the relation of time and eternity in human existence we meet with two forms; the first is endlessness, and the second is the religious ability/possibility to position oneself over against time in the ‘antithetical attitude of thought’. This thought attitude itself is typical of theoretical thinking, but the question is: What makes it possible? Its possibility lies in this, that human beings have the gift (which can be misused but never completely lost) to take a stance as over against himself as creature, in order to attain theoretical insight into creation.

On first hearing this is a Dooyeweerdian statement, at least if we substitute ‘eternity’ with ‘supra-temporal(ity)’. We recall that Dooyeweerd, too, spoke of religious self-knowledge as necessary condition for the theoretical attitude of thought. On closer inspection, however, Popma introduces other accents here than Dooyeweerd does, and this has everything to do with the theme of evil and the transience of creation.

Because of the power of evil in all its manifestations, human life is in continuous tension. On the one hand, Popma emphasizes, the whole of human existence is subject to decay and vanity, non-fulfilment. There is no sheltered zone, no cove untouched by the storms of life, not even in the heart. On the other hand, a human being is safe and secure with Christ in God through the tie of faith. Accordingly, Popma (1963, 291-311) states, this bond of faith with Christ cannot be identified with experience, not with the experience of faith, nor with a philosophical or theological doctrine. To believe is to know Christ, and whoever knows Christ has eternal life, even in temporal existence.

Popma stretches the tension to the limit. The relation between time and eternity is a duality. Strictly speaking this duality need not harden into a contradiction. This thought attitude itself is typical of theoretical thinking, but the possibility to position oneself over against time in the Gegenstand relation. In Popma ‘above’ and ‘over against’ more or less coincide.

Starting point here is what Jesus tells Martha at the death of Lazarus: ‘He who believes in me, though he die, yet shall he live’ (John 11:25). The inviolable of human being is the faith in this Christ, the Christ who commanded Lazarus to return from death. This faith is inviolable to the extent that not only illness, decay, violence and betrayal have no power over it; it is unassailable even in death and at the Last Judgment.

The passage refers to the church, but can easily be applied to human beings. To be church, Popma seems to say, is never quite attainable in this life. Sin and imperfection make a caricature of the church as God intended it. The church’s being-not-of-this-world is often unjustifiably identified with its being-in-the-world. However, Popma (1965, 253) says “To the degree that the congregation lets its ‘not-of-this-worldness’ be submerged in ‘being-in-the-world’, to the degree that the church concretely historicizes itself, it exists by grace of a myth...and lives in a mythical time.” The myth, then, consists in this that the church identifies its ‘being-from-heaven’ with its historical form. To be sure, the church needs organization, yet it “must with equal insistence deny its organizational form. Its sole possibility is to exist in Widerspruch (contradiction).” Whatever one may think of this passage — marked by Popma’s own experience in the ecclesiastical battles of the 1940s and 1960s — we do recognize
bond of faith with Christ is not something separate in humans, something that escapes time and personal life-stories (Popma 1963, 304). The tension felt here is expressed in the ‘nevertheless’ of faith. The whole of a human being in its ‘outer’ appearance is subject to tiredness, decay, illness and finally death; nevertheless, the human being in its ‘inner’ existence is renewed from day to day. ‘Outer’ and ‘inner’ both refer to the whole human being, be it from different points of view (Popma 1963, 265-289; the phrase is found on 288).

On occasion Popma criticized Dooyeweerd’s teaching of the supra-temporal heart. He saw it as an improper form of metaphysics (Popma 1963, 308-309; Popma 1962, 78ff). We can now see why: according to Popma there is nothing in a human being, no metaphysical ego, immune to the effect of evil and decay. Popma’s criticism on this point is not well founded. In Dooyeweerd, too, the heart is certainly no storm-free shelter — think of his characterization of the religious antithesis as a battle in the ‘religious root-community’ (i.e. in the heart). Dooyeweerd took a firm stance against all forms of substantialization of the heart as metaphysical abstraction. Still, this does not detract from Popma’s merit that he, as one of the first in the movement of reformational philosophy, called attention to the historicity of mankind and that he linked this historicity with the theme of evil and transience.44

(c) Religious self-knowledge and the transcendental presuppositions:
Geertsema and others
How can religious self-knowledge, which is the self-knowledge of a concrete and unique person, simultaneously serve as transcendental presupposition (that is, as the non-debatable condition) of the theoretical attitude of thought? In other words, what is the relation between the general, philosophical-theoretical character of this presupposition and the concrete, uniquely personal character of self-knowledge? This is the central question raised by some later students in the discussion with Dooyeweerd.

Geertsema (1970, 47), the first to state the problem clearly, wonders whether the link between the two is legitimate. According to him, the individual character of the heart as concentration point may not be all that objectionable in the theory of knowledge. One could argue that at issue in epistemology is the individual thinker’s act of knowing. In Dooyeweerd however epistemology and ontology (cosmology) are joined. The idea of the heart as supra-temporal point of concentration is the decisive link. For Dooyeweerd the selfhood or heart is the expression of the unity of the modal diversity as ontic (cosmic) basic datum (Geertsema 1970, 48). The whole of the temporal cosmos is concentrated in the heart as transcendental presupposition.

Typical of Dooyeweerd is that precisely the religious nature of the selfhood makes possible the transition from the epistemological to the ontological (or cosmological). Religion consists in this, that the Origin expresses itself in the

44 Others who should be mentioned are Schoep (1948) and Van Dijk (1965) concerning neurosis.
heart as supra-temporal point of concentration, and that the fullness of creation, as totality of meaning, orients itself to the Origin of meaning in the heart as religious root-unity.45

Actually, we meet a second problem here. We began with the question as to the relation between concrete religious self-knowledge and self-knowledge as transcendental presupposition. The additional question however is: What is ontologically presupposed in this religious self-knowledge?

Concerning the first question: it is indeed difficult to maintain that the fullness of created reality is concentrated in every individual human heart. Nor does Dooyeweerd mean to say so. In this connection he refers to a ‘both individual and supra-individual’ centre of human existence. In its selfhood the I points beyond itself to that which gathers the totality of mankind into a unity in the ‘root’ of creation, fall, and redemption (NC I, 60). The individual I, then, participates in what Dooyeweerd (rather inelegantly) calls the ‘root-community’. This root-community is not a concretely identifiable social, or even less ecclesiastical phenomenon; rather it is the spiritual community of all of mankind as created, fallen into sin, and invited to appropriate salvation in Christ. Still, the question is whether this justification resolves the philosophical problem as such. Geertsema (1970, 49) points out that with respect to the religious (root-)community the initial problem returns. Can the biblical understanding of a religious community be virtually identified with the transcendental character of the root-community as unity of modal diversity?46 For Geertsema and others this is a rhetorical question.

With respect to the question about the ontological presuppositions in religious self-knowledge: in the presentation of Dooyeweerd’s ideas about the supra-temporality of the heart I continually emphasized the dynamic character of religious self-knowledge. In the course of his life Dooyeweerd underscored this with increasing insistence, so that at some point he refers to the religious-supra-temporal as ‘central sphere of occurrence’ (NC I, 32). It will not do, then, to accuse him of substantialization of the heart. Nonetheless, one might ask whether this approach to religious dynamism does not implicitly presuppose a specific (possibly questionable) ontology. Relative to anthropology we should recall Dooyeweerd’s elaboration of the idea of the human being as image of God:

Meaning is ‘ex origine’ the convergence of all temporal aspects of existence into one supertemporal focus, and this focus...is the religious root of creation, which has meaning and hence existence only in virtue of the sovereign creative act of God.

The fullness of meaning is implied in the religious image of God, expressing itself in the root of our cosmos and in the splitting-up of that root in time. (NC II, 30)

45 For example, see NC I, 55: “[God] has expressed His image in man by concentrating its entire temporal existence in the radical religious unity of an ego in which the totality of meaning of the temporal cosmos was to be focused upon its Origin.”

46 Later, Geertsema (1992, 130) repeated this criticism and on that occasion spoke of an “unjustified metabasis eis allo genos” that is, an impermissible linkage of biblical teaching and philosophical problems.
[God] created man after His own image. He gave expression to His Divine fullness of Being [sic!] in the whole of His creation, as a totality of meaning. (NC II, 307).\textsuperscript{47}

Mankind, then, does not only reveal something of God, God also reveals something of himself in mankind: his fullness is expressed in the totality (of being) of creation, concentrated in the heart, specifically in the supra-temporal heart.\textsuperscript{48} Geersema points to a neo-Platonic theo-ontological posing of the problem (Plotinus; going back to Parmenides). In Dooyeweerd the relation between God and creation is a relation between oneness-in-Origin and manifold-in-time. Along with rigorous discontinuity there is continuity between God and creation as well. Both continuity and discontinuity come to expression in the metaphor of the prism: the one ray of supertemporal unity is broken up by the cosmic order of time (the prism) into a modal diversity of rays (Geertsema 1970, 149-153).

Geertsema himself prefers a line of thinking pursued by Schilder and Berkouwer, interpreting 'image of God' as representation, in other words, as a

\textsuperscript{47} See also the passage in Thesis V: “This revelation concerning the ‘soul’ of human existence as integral centre of the whole of corporality, is entirely correlate with the Self-Revelation of God as integral Creator of heaven and earth, who has no autonomous power against Him.” This idea of correlation should however be sharply distinguished from the idea of \textit{analogia entis} (analogy between the being of God and the being of creation). Dooyeweerd firmly rejects the \textit{analogia entis}.

\textsuperscript{48} Dooyeweerd remained faithful to Abraham Kuyper (1898/1943, 20) here, specifically to the well-known, almost infamous passage from the \textit{Lectures on Calvinism}:

“Hence the first claim demands that such a life system shall find its starting-point in a special interpretation of our relation to God. This is not accidental, but imperative. If such an action is to put its stamp upon our entire life, it must start from that point in our consciousness in which our life is still undivided and lies comprehended in its unity, — not in the spreading vines but in the root from which the vines spring. This point, of course, lies in the antithesis between all that is finite in our human life and the infinite that lies beyond it. Here alone we find the common source from which the different streams of our human life spring and separate themselves. Personally it is our repeated experience that in the depths of our hearts, at the point where we disclose ourselves to the Eternal One, all the rays of our life converge as in one focus, and there alone regain that harmony which we so often and so painfully lose in the stress of daily duty.”

Wiskerke (1978, 75ff.) called this semi-mystical view ‘the heart condition’ of the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea (see also the interesting notes on pp. 259ff). Kuyper’s statement in the Stone Lectures is in part based on his interpretation of Ecclesiastes 3:11 (“[God] has put eternity into man’s mind”):

“That age is the world of the Eternal, from which time, and with time all the finite, was born… The age that lets you leap over the boundaries of the finite and envelops you in the ocean of the heavenly and Divine… that awakens your faith as a wholly other, wholly independent faculty of thought and reveals you to yourself as a wholly other, far richer and brilliant being than the world ever allowed you to see in its mirror.” (\textit{De Heraut} 1781, 18-2-1912; cited in Dutch by Wiskerke 1978, 79).

Wiskerke suggests that this semi-mysticism evinces some affinity with thinkers such as Clemens of Alexandria, Origines and particularly Gregory of Nyssa. According to Gregory, through relinquishing the passions and by displaying some of the divine model and ultimately through self-concentration, the soul attains a kind of \textit{extasis} in which a human being ‘in itself’ possesses God. Wiskerke admits that, to be sure, Kuyper was a world conqueror rather than a hermit. The parallel goes halfway only; Kuyper’s is a \textit{semi}-mysticism. “The inner-core experience, then, is starting-point rather than conclusion; it urges clarification in reflection and application in practice” (Wiskerke 1978, 84).
category of agency rather than a category of being: God has appointed human beings to responsible acts; to be human is to be response in responsibility (Berkouwer 1957, 51ff; Schilder 1947, 263-306; Geertsema 1992, 137-146). Such responding is woven into the structure of creation. The ontic must not be played out against the relational here. It is in the relation to God and the neighbour that being-human deepens and that humans come to their own, their ontic destination (Berkouwer 1957, 289).49

Brüggeman-Kruijff, who also notes a certain affinity between Dooyeweerd’s philosophy of time and neo-Platonic conceptions of time (time as medium between the one and the many), in addition points out that Dooyeweerd’s emphasis on the unity of the heart tends to ignore the inner disruption and brokenness of existence.50 If this criticism is justified — as I believe it is — there is more at stake. One could for example also question the notion of the I as centre. Klapwijk (1987) noted that it might be more fitting to say — with some phenomenologists — that the I is eccentric, instead of centric or centered. In Vollenhoven (1967, 96) we espy something like this when he states that Christ, rather than we ourselves, is the centre of our existence. In fact, in Dooyeweerd the I is not centred in itself either, as for instance is clear from his use of the notion of ‘existence’ and from his emphasis on the concentric dynamism towards the Origin. Still, one might ask whether terms such as ‘point’ (of concentration) and ‘centre’ are entirely suitable to do justice to this structural being-outside-of-oneself.

My suggestion is that it is especially the transcendental framework of thought that causes the trouble. Terms like ‘referring’ and ‘expressing’ do point to the dynamics between God and creation, yet they are less appropriate when it comes to understand the full scope of the — very actual — relationship between God and creation. We never encounter the I as something by itself, as apart; invariably we meet the I in relationships, one of which is the I–self relation. This I–self relation is interwoven with the relation to others and to God.51 Dooyeweerd would certainly not deny this, but in his approach to these

49 The background of this is the dilemma between substantialism (starting out from the primary of substance over relation) versus functionalism (where function or relation is primary over substance). According to Dooyeweerd there is a third, Berkouwer says, namely that “the relation does not in the least threaten, dim or dissolve reality; rather, it makes it possible to understand the nature of this reality in its relatedness to God.” In other words, if some hold that a relational view of man does not adequately portray the ‘reality’, i.e., the ontic status of being-human, they betray that they are still enslaved to a view in which substances are too much seen as self-sufficient. But if relations and substances should not be played out over against each other, the implication is that the supra-temporal heart, too, exists in a ‘relational-ontic’ sense. It is not surprising therefore that Blosser interprets Berkouwer’s comment as a plea for a mitigated substance-thinking, in other words, as a thinking that admits the existence of substances, though without ascribing self-sufficiency to them. See Blosser (1993, 205-08) and Evans (1993).


51 In the pertinent passage Dooyeweerd’s view of the I as a transcendental concentration point is contrasted with Kierkegaard’s comment on the I (or self). Kierkegaard calls the self “a relation which relates to itself, and in relating to itself relates to something else.” This ‘something else’ is a power, namely: God. See Kierkegaard (1849, 43) and Glas (1995a, 74-76).
relations the relation to the Origin predominates. The very term Origin however narrows the terminological field to a back-and-forth of referring and expressing, concentration and divergence, the one and the many. When the relation between God and human beings is pried loose from the transcendental framework the relational nature of human beings can be understood as ‘image’ of the relational nature of God as trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The term ‘Origin’ does not bring this relational nature of the divine Trinity in focus. Also, justice can be done to the fact that spiritual unity does not wipe out the differences between people; rather, it fully recognizes them. The transcendental framework leads to one-sided emphasis on the unity of the human being and leaves little room for the recognition of being-other and being-apart from the other. Core of the critique here is not so much that Dooyeweerd’s anthropology is insufficiently relational (it certainly is relational). The point is that the transcendental framework in which this anthropology is cast leads to one-sided stress on notions such as centre, unity and indivisibility.

(d) A different voice: John Cooper
Anglo-Saxon publications make clear that the rejection of the body–spirit dualism is certainly not self-evident, not in the context of Christian philosophy and Christian theology either. Here again a important role is played by the assessment of the Christian confession concerning the continued existence of the soul after death. I restrict myself to the work by John Cooper (1982), (1989), who wrote a number of articles and a full-length book on this topic.52

Cooper wants to proceed from the biblical statements regarding the soul and its life after death. Part of his book therefore consists in a discussion of relevant Bible passages and the comments on them by a variety of philosophers and theologians. Ultimately he accepts a holistic (the whole is more than the sum of its parts) dualism. Biblical teaching concerning humans is both ‘holis tic’ in the sense that it stresses the functional integration of human existence prior to death, and dualistic, in the sense of a non-corporeal continuity of the human being until the day of resurrection. Cooper (1989, 253) holds that monistic views run aground over against the biblical notion of the ‘in-between’ and the awakening on the First Day.

What precisely does this dualism imply? Is it a dualism of substances, or functions (properties), or some other version? If it involves a dualism of substances, death would take the body but not the soul. Not the whole human being would die; part would not. Can this do justice to the biblical message concerning death as an event encompassing the whole of the human being?

Cooper holds that this objection proceeds from an erroneous view of death, i.e. death as extinction, total annihilation, disappearance. But in the Bible death does not mean that everything stops (extinction); rather, the human being enters a new mode of existence. When a dualist says that John Smith died he

52 Cooper does not stand alone, as is clear from a statement by Alvin Plantinga in an interview in Beweging 59 (1995), 11. Plantinga states that he has two objections to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy: the rejection of the body-soul dualism and the transcendental framework of his philosophy. For a dualistic approach see also Swinburne (1987).
means that John Smith was drawn out of his natural corporeal existence in order to metamorphose to an other form of existence.\textsuperscript{53} The soul, too, experiences death; it moves through the moment of death. Nevertheless, souls have no independence of their own. In their existence they are entirely dependent on divine providence. It is very possible that they vanish, for the soul’s life after death rests solely on the will of God. It is the will of God not to destroy humans entirely in death. We could say that Cooper accepts a mitigated conception of substances. Body and soul are ontically distinct realities, but they are no substances resting in themselves.

What are we to think if we start from a dualism of functions (or qualities/properties)? Is it not the case that dualism unavoidably leads to the attributing of properties to the soul, such that Christian anthropology comes perilously close to Platonism? Does dualism not imply that the soul should at least have the property of immortality? Again, Cooper’s reply is one of mitigation. According to him it depends on what the term ‘immortality’ is meant to name. If immortality means ‘not subject to death’, then the dualist must deny the soul this property. We just noted that the soul is also subjected to death, though not to extinction (Cooper 1989, 214).\textsuperscript{54} If however immortality means no more than ‘surviving physical death’ there is no reason not to attribute this property to the soul. In doing so, Christian dualists are not condemned to a Platonic conception of immortality as an essential (or necessary) property of a substance called soul. The immortality of the soul, in the sense of a personal continued existence in the ‘in-between’, is, as gift of God, a contingent (non-necessary) characteristic. Moreover, immortality is something other than eternity. In the ‘in-between’ the deceased remain in the line of time as do the living.

Major argument in this dualistic approach, then, is that there is an interval, a period of time between death and resurrection, during which persons continue without a body (Cooper 1989, 215-217). This dualism is both ontological — although not in the sense of a separation of self-sufficient substances — and functional. The soul possesses properties that the body does not have, before and after death.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{53} One also could apply the rejection of the notion of extinction to the body. Paul calls the body a seed sown in the field to be raised on the First Day (I Cor. 15: 35-49). As I see it, this Scriptural thought has been insufficiently reckoned with in Christian anthropology. Actually, rejection of the notion of extinction can no longer be used to argue for a dualism of body and soul.

\textsuperscript{54} One could ask whether the soul’s being subject to death does not imply an element of discontinuity as well. Cooper stresses the continued, personal existence of the soul. The Bible however speaks of death as a mortification of sin and that, surely, implies a profound change. In death personal identity remains, I stay myself, yet become wholly different from what I was prior to my death.

\textsuperscript{55} Cooper (1989, 221) also comments on indications in Scripture that persons continue life after death with a visible form of corporeality: the appearances of Samuel, Moses and Elijah. With great reservation Cooper tends towards the view that these were visible manifestations of energy, probably comparable to the ether-body in spiritism (and anthroposophy). Popma, who also places great emphasis on the soul’s continued temporal life after death, is more cautious but he does refer to a continuation of the temporal function-cloak in some other, unknown form. For Cooper this thought is an argument in favour of dualism (in view of the difference
Cooper also comments on Dooyeweerd’s anthropology — in great appreciation. This need not surprise us, for he interprets this anthropology as a version of his own holistic dualism. As he sees it, Dooyeweerd’s holism comes to expression in the philosophy of the enkaptically interwoven structures; his dualism is found in the conception that the supra-temporal heart continues to exist after the body is shed.56 According to Cooper, Dooyeweerd also ‘dichotomizes’ human existence, namely by death. Here Cooper is right and wrong. He is right because Dooyeweerd does indeed say that the soul is not touched by temporal death; wrong because he misjudges the idea of concentration. As noted earlier, concentration implies that the whole of temporal human existence is expressed in the supra-temporal heart.57 In consequence of his denial of the idea of concentration Cooper’s interpretation of the supra-temporal heart again tends to a conception of the whole and its parts; relative to the ‘whole’ of heart and body the heart is but a ‘part’. For Dooyeweerd however the heart is not a part, not something extra, a *donum superadditum*; it is the articulation of the fullness of human existence.58 Cooper falls victim to his view between this energy-body and the ordinary earthly body). In Popma the idea of the continuation of the function-cloak is meant as anti-dualistic argument.

56 Especially in connection with this ‘before and after death’ questions can be raised. Does the soul emerge from the process of dying unchanged? I suggested that, considering the no-longer-in-sin after death, this is unlikely. There is continuity and discontinuity. The question is whether the discontinuity is so great that it threatens the identity of the soul as *non-material substance*. Cooper would not go this far, because he seems to identify personal identity with the existence of the soul. Such identification is questionable however, not only because in this way the personal character of corporeality becomes a problem (the personification of the body is then secondary since it is achieved only in the joining of the corporeal and the spiritual), it is also questionable because human personhood ultimately is and remains a secret — a mystery that permits no identification with whatever substance.

57 In the passage at issue Cooper quotes Dooyeweerd via the English translation of Berkouwer (1957). Berkouwer in turn quoted Dooyeweerd’s (1940, 181) article on the problem of time, which does contain the passage about the human soul which “naar het getuigenis van de Schrift door den tijsdelijken dood niet getroffen wordt, maar ook na de aflegging van het ‘lichaam’, d.i. van *heel den tijsdelijken* in individualiteits-structuur besloten *bestaansvorm*, blijft voorbestaan.” But the translation is incorrect! The translators of Berkouwer’s book rendered the passage as follows: “The soul, Scripture shows, is not affected by temporal death, but after the end of the body (i.e. of all the temporal aspects of man), it continues as a form of existence with an individuality structure” (Cooper 1989, 251). The Dutch text, Berkouwer (1957, 285, note 148), quotes Dooyeweerd correctly. In Dooyeweerd the term ‘individuality structure’ refers to the body; the translators related it, wrongly, to the soul. It is likely that this has occasioned Cooper’s misunderstanding. The passage should read: “As Scripture testifies, [the human soul] is not touched by temporal death, but continues to exist even after the shedding of the ‘body’, i.e. [the shedding] of the entire temporal, individuality-structure-enclosed *form of existence*.”

58 In Cooper’s interpretation of Dooyeweerd two further errors are present. Cooper (1989, 250) says that Dooyeweerd’s “notion of the ego allows the supranatural to shape the temporal but not the reverse.” Dooyeweerd however speaks of both divergence and concentration. Cooper also states that in Dooyeweerd the basic directions of thinking, imagining and willing are rooted in the heart, not in the temporal act structure. The passage at issue deals with the functioning of the soul after death. Cooper holds that such rootedness of the basic directions in the heart allows us to argue that the basic directions can also function outside the earthly (i.e. temporal) modes. Apart from the fact that for Dooyeweerd the supra-temporal belongs to the creational (earthly) order, Cooper neglects that Dooyeweerd strongly denied the idea of an incorporeal personal centre: acts and basic directions are inconceivable without involvement of the temporal function cloak, c.q. the act structure.
of the soul as substance, and to his identification of the substantial soul with a complex of mental functions and act functions essentially divorced from the body and its biotic functions.

The above does not mean that Dooyeweerd’s view is immune to critical questioning. Concerning the soul Dooyeweerd says that, unlike the body, the soul is not subjected to temporal death but that if estranged from Jesus Christ, it is subjected to eternal death (Thesis V). However, if the soul is the concentration point of all of temporal existence, then how can temporal death leave it untouched? How can this incorporeal self after death still love, desire or remember? Strictly speaking, Dooyeweerd’s anthropology — as transcendental anthropology — does not allow an answer to these questions. Still, there are indications in Dooyeweerd that aspects of temporal functioning return or repeat ‘centrally’ (in the supra-temporal sphere). Dooyeweerd speaks of central love, for example. And religion is something central for him as well. One can wonder if this does not imply a doubling or repetition of the temporal in the supra-temporal.\footnote{This question was posed by Brüggeman-Krujjif (1981) as well.} Such doubling would not only suggest a duality between the temporal and the supra-temporal; it would also run counter to the transcendental character of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.

In the discussion on the soul’s life after death insufficient consideration is given until now to the thought that in death creation takes place as it were in the reverse direction. Just as at bottom the creation of the human being is a secret, so also is death a secret — which should render us cautious in identifying the soul after death with either a mental complex of functions (Cooper) or a philosophical construction such as the transcendental, supra-temporal I (Dooyeweerd).\footnote{Wiskerke (1978) pointed at this in the chapter on the semimystical heart conception of Kuyper; see also Wiskerke (1963, 224).}

The difference between Dooyeweerd and Cooper rests mostly on a difference in their approach to philosophy as such. Dooyeweerd is far more hesitant than Cooper to mix biblical revelation concerning humans with philosophical analysis. His work contains but very few references to the ‘in-between’ and the resurrection. Still, especially philosophical anthropology cannot do without the Bible’s multicoloured speaking about human beings. On the other hand, Cooper’s work shows how readily philosophical analysis can go awry in this.

3. New systematic initiatives

(a) Revival of the philosophical debate on anthropology

If we leave aside some incidental contributions, it is not until the middle of the 1980s that we can speak of a revival of the debate on anthropology in reformational philosophy. In 1986 the Association for Calvinistic Philosophy organized the international conference ‘On being human’.\footnote{Wiskerke (1978) pointed at this in the chapter on the semimystical heart conception of Kuyper; see also Wiskerke (1963, 224).} Moreover, in the same year Ouweneel published his PhD thesis on Dooyeweerd’s anthropology. In the wake of this a study group in anthropology held a series of meetings and

\footnote{The contributions to the congress were published in Philosophia Reformata 1992 and 1993.}
presented the results of its reflections in the first issue of *Philosophia Reformata* 1989. Below I highlight some aspects brought out in these publications.

(b) The anticipating direction of being human

In an important paper Stafleu (1991) suggests that those working with Dooyeweerd’s legacy are only now beginning to harvest the anthropological fruits of his thought. Central in Stafleu’s own treatment of this system is the thought that being-human comes about par excellence in the *anticipatory direction*, that is, in reaching forwards to higher functions, and ultimately the faith function. This approach is found in Dooyeweerd as well. The act structure is flexible and open exactly because of the process of disclosure in the anticipatory sense. In connection with this anticipating Dooyeweerd speaks of the *transcending direction of time* in the order of disclosure of the aspects. Stafleu (1986) accepts Dooyeweerd’s teaching of cosmic time, but because he places great emphasis on transcending as anticipating he seems able to avoid the transcendental problem of unity and diversity (see above).\(^62\) It is no exaggeration to say that in Stafleu anticipation and retrocipation take the place of what in Dooyeweerd would be concentration and divergence.

We can understand why Stafleu approaches matters in this way when we consider his views on natural science. In natural science the methodological restriction to the physical, including the retrocipations of the physical, have proved to be enormously successful. In relation to humans however, this approach is doomed to failure. In human beings the post-psychical functions in particular can hardly be found in non-disclosed form. Humans are active in every one of the aspects, not only in retrocipation but also, and especially, in the anticipatory direction. Hence the methodological restriction to the functions and their retrocipation is an impossible task. Moreover, the doctrine of the individuality structures is of limited value in the post-psychical. The act structure for example, has neither a founding nor a qualifying function. Stafleu does not explicitly say so, but one can wonder whether this structure can still be called a substructure.\(^63\)

In view of the above it is understandable that in discussing post-psychical functioning Stafleu leans mostly on modal analysis. A difficulty arises here however. Human existence occurs in a manner so multiform and varied that it

\(^{62}\) Stafleu (1991, 130) says: “It would be utterly wrong to relate the religious character of humanity exclusively to questions of destiny, unity and origin.” The religious nature of human beings is given with their place in the cosmos, in the normative position relative to the realms of the plants and the animals, and relative to the history of culture.

\(^{63}\) Stafleu adds two substructures: a spatial and a kinematic substructure. Arguments in support of this are found in Stafleu (1985), (1989, Chapters 3-5). Moreover, he amends Dooyeweerd in connection with the interlacement of substructures through additional distinctions between possible founding functions. The kinematic substructure splits into two, a substructure with a numerical founding function and a substructure with a spatial founding function; the physical substructure thus consists in three substructures, the biotic in four and the psychical in five. Together with the single spatial structure this means a total of fifteen substructures. Stafleu here neglects the figure of the *founding enkapsis* in Dooyeweerd the underlying *substructure* as individuality structure, rather than the foundational modality, is the foundation for higher substructures. see *NC* III, 653-661 and Ouweneel (1986, 191).
is hardly possible to abstract personal functioning to the extent that we are left with a purely ‘modal subject’. Still, Stafleu demonstrates that it is possible to clarify human existence in terms of the modal subject–object relations. These relations refer to subject functions rather than subjects (persons, egos). He correctly notes that this approach, which seeks to take into account the relational character of being-human, has so far hardly been explored.

Notable in the context of the relations between humans and animals is that Stafleu attributes to animals subject functions in the logical, the lingual and the social — with the restriction that in these functions animals function mostly in a retrocipatory way. In other words, post-psychical animal behaviour, expressed in the (limited) ability to distinguish, in primitive symbolizing and in mutual interaction, is wholly marked by biotic and psychical functioning.

As to the body–mind distinction, Stafleu holds that at issue is primarily the duality of anticipatory and retrocipatory directions. Because of the openness and flexibility of human existence and because the human person cannot be analysed as individuality structure with a leading and a founding function, all emphasis should be placed on the aspect of direction. Human existence is characterized by a simultaneous being-directed, in both retrocipation (corporeal) and anticipation (spiritual). Both directions involve all modal aspects.

Stafleu’s stress on anticipation is emphatic to the point that he tends towards a form of emergence thinking. Under specific conditions there are structures that develop (in the anticipating sense) such that new structures can emerge. This does not mean that laws for these new structures did not yet exist; they were just not operational. If I understand Stafleu correctly, he (1991, 127) attributes the active and effective moment towards such emergence mostly to the subject side.

Let me close this section with a few comments on the enkaptic structural whole as morphological (or form-) totality. With Dengerink (1986, 256 ff, 333, 339), Stafleu has little use for this characterization. His hesitation is understandable, but it does leave unexplored a possible line of study offered in Dooyeweerd’s theory of structure.

Concerning structural wholes generally Dooyeweerd says that these are identifiable by either their objective sensible form or their objective cultural form. With regard to the body he states that the form totality is expressed in the ‘outer’ body structure. This means that he opts for the first type: the body is

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64 ‘Emergence’ is meant in the sense that in the course of evolution structures spontaneously developed that, compared to existing structures, are conceptually or ontically of a qualitatively different order. Within the continuity of the evolution process, then, something new emerges. Stafleu is no evolutionist in the sense that evolution theory is his worldview; he does adhere to the theory of evolution. As he sees it, systematic reformational philosophy has concerned itself far too little with the issue of evolution. Stafleu holds that evolution is often mistakenly taken to mean that the emergence of new structures, biotic structures for example, can be explained via the laws for existing structures, in other words, by physical-chemical laws. Approached in this way, the irreducibility of the modal aspects is at issue (the classical objection from the side of reformational philosophy). The problem however dissolves entirely as long as law and that which is subjected to it are not mixed. The laws for new structures are not themselves a product of evolution; they become operational once the situation is ready for them.
recognizable in virtue of its objective sensible form. This seems self-evident, but leaves us somewhat dissatisfied. The adjective ‘outer’ suggests that the intertwinement of the substructures manifests itself primarily in a spatial-visual sense; the spatially proportioned and demarcated body as spatial and visible cluster of intertwinements.

In the experience of the body spatially visible demarcation and proportion undoubtedly plays an important role. Other ‘demarcations’ however, though not primarily visual, seem no less important. Consider emotional and social boundaries: we allow A to come closer to us emotionally than B; in mutual interaction A takes up more space than B. Dooyeweerd’s accent on the outer form of the body (morphology) is too narrow a criterion to encompass the whole of corporeality. Humans are not locked up in their skin. If we would continue to stress the spatial we should also take into account retrocipations to the spatial in for example the psychical, social and juridical aspects and, alongside of this, consider the integrating significance of the inner representation of the own body, our bodily self-perception (see Glas 1995b). In patients suffering from anorexia nervosa and in some psychotic patients this inner representation is seriously distorted. In the encounter with such patients we are struck by the importance of the body as perceived by oneself, for emotional experiences, for self-assessment and for the organization of behaviour.

In addition to such spatial analogies we can also think of a variant of the second possibility in Dooyeweerd’s conception, i.e. recognition of the body — in its singularity and totality — as ‘objective cultural form’. Humans are formatively active beings (the historical mode of being). It is in such formative activity, in work, play and art, that humans reveal their singularity and wholeness. We might term this an inner intertwinement of the form-totality of human corporeality — as complement to the outer, morphological intertwinement. To my knowledge this possibility in Dooyeweerd’s thought concerning the characterization of the enkaptic structural whole has so far escaped notice.

(c) The psychical aspect; emotions
Linking up with suggestions already found in Vollenhoven, Troost and Van Dijk, Ouweneel proposed to divide the psychical aspect in a perceptive and a sensitive aspect. The perceptive relates to elementary or basic perceptions. These emerge from un-reflected awareness of sensible stimuli. Certain instinctive behaviours and tendencies in animals, Ouweneel argues, belong to the perceptive as well. The sensitive aspect involves emotions, impulses and drives.

Ouweneel finds a major argument for splitting the psychical into a perceptive and a sensitive modality in the views of neurophysiologist MacLean, who states that the brain consists in three morphologically and biochemically distinct parts: brainstem, including basal nuclei (‘reptilian brain’), limbic system (‘paleo-mammalian brain’) and neocortex (‘neo-mammalian brain’). This triad corresponds wonderfully with the proposed division into a perceptive, a sensitive, and a spiritive (or act-) structure. Brainstem and basal nuclei would function in the perceptive sense; the limbic system would correspond to the
sensitive sphere, whereas the neocortex would function in the spiritive sense (Ouweneel 1986, 104). The term ‘spiritive’ refers to what Dooyeweerd terms the act structure.

A second argument to split up the psychical modality rests on application of Dooyeweerd’s critique of antinomies to the psychical. The critique turns on the inconsistencies and contradictions that arise when scientific inquiry of phenomena fails to do justice to modal distinctions. Ouweneel (1986, 115) argues that inconsistencies and contradictions in fact arise when perceptions and emotions are reduced to a single modality. Such reduction is confronted with the difficulty that some perceptions arise quite independent of feelings and emotions, conversely however no feelings and emotions arise entirely independent of perceptions. This would imply that for the psychical certain sensitive laws obtain that do not hold for all subjects functioning within that law sphere. After all, we accept that animals function in the psychical law sphere. But of many lower animal orders we do not say that they have emotions and drives, i.e. that they function in the sensitive sense.

Ouweneel’s proposal is attractive and stimulating, but also meets with objections. First, there is an empirical objection. Brain stem and basal nuclei by themselves probably do not suffice to give rise to even the most elementary form of consciousness: elementary forms of consciousness presuppose cortical activity, at least in humans. This leads to a second question. Is it not the case that Ouweneel too readily identifies certain brain structures with substructures in the philosophical theory of structure? Above I noted that in Dooyeweerd’s view brain processes must always be studied in terms of the totality of human functioning, that is, in terms of all four substructures. It looks as if Ouweneel identifies the various (anatomical and functional) layers in the brain with the functioning of modal aspects of a given substructure.

These objections do not do away with the factual difference between perception as such and primary affective assessment. The question is whether this difference is sufficiently incisive to postulate the existence of a separate sensitive law sphere. We might take a different path: accept, for instance, that both perception and affective assessment are subject to an underlying qualifying process. We could think of the fact that animals are less rigorously bound to their environment than plants, and that for survival in and adaption to a changing Umwelt a good many innate behavioural responses must possess a certain variability. Learning processes play a major role in putting such variability

65 A well-known example of this is one of the paradoxes of Zeno, who argued that Achilles can never overtake the turtle if the latter is allowed to start out first. When Achilles has covered the distance that the turtle had at point a the turtle has moved on, and when Achilles has covered that distance as well, the turtle has moved up too, etc. The paradox dissolves as soon as it is recognized that the spatial analysis (distances) is not enough to study the phenomenon of speed. Speed is a kinematic category. When the spatial aspect is not related to time (as in the kinematic aspect) speed difference is a phenomenon that cannot be grasped.

66 In human beings in a vegetative condition the cerebral cortex and important parts of the limbic system are switched off. The brainstem (and basic nuclei) however are intact. These patients are in permanent coma, and are unconscious, although they can as a rule breathe and swallow without mechanical help. In other words, these coma patients have an intact ‘reptilian brain’, but do not function in the perceptive sense.
to use, even in the lowest animal species (see Carew, Walters and Kandel 1981, Kandel 1983, Kandel and Hawkins 1992). Here the difference between signal-
ing (perceptive) and pre-reflexive assessment (sensitive) disappears, because in the processing of many signals it is not so much the complexity of conscious-
ess that counts, but the complexity of the (non-conscious) information pro-
cessing. Animals typically learn, because they are able to attribute maintenance
and survival values to all kinds of signals in the environment. Learning
processes determine, depending on the ‘sensitive value’ of the signal (danger
signals, safety signals), whether certain patterns of behaviour will be streng-
thened or inhibited. Memory or recollection plays a major role in such ‘value
assessments’.

I conclude this section with a brief comment on the discussion regarding
emotions. Dooyeweerd, we saw, states that the enkaptic build-up of the body
implies that

to the degree that the highest structure in the structural whole temporarily
doses to play its leading role, the lower [structures] will also manifest them-
selves outside [i.e. as separate], in accordance with the law proper to them. (Compare for example the temporary rule of the passions when rational deliberation
is momentarily absent). (Thesis XI)

Dengerink (1986, 133) holds that here Dooyeweerd gives the impression that
emotional life “is chaotic in nature and needs to be kept on track by reason
(!).” Dooyeweerd certainly does take the term ‘binding’ (enkaptic binding)
very literally. Glas (1989) showed that within Dooyeweerd’s thought more
nuance is possible, namely by understanding the structure of emotions in a
threefold sense:

a) as substructure subject to its proper (rigid) laws manifesting itself in an
‘outward’ sense (see Thesis XI, just cited); this relates to border situations
(an outburst of anger);
b) as substructure intentionally objectified within the act structure; think of
the situation that attention is paid to a specific emotional reaction (you
realize that you are angry when you notice your clenched fists);
c) as substructure taken up into and disclosed by the act; think of the
affective colouring of many activities (angrily washing the dishes).

Still, each of these three versions fails to account for the fact that emotions first
of all have a pre-reflexively signalizing and orienting function, and that this
signalling and orienting does not only tell us something about the signalized
(the emotional object), but also and especially about the one who undergoes
the emotion. Emotions, in other words, have to do with the I-self relation. The
I-self relation should be understood as a relation between the I in the central
sense and aspects of the body structure. Emotions refer to a subtle, initially

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67 Over the past decades it has been established that the so-called orientation reaction is
strongly influenced by these ‘sensitively’ determined processes. Contra Ouweevel (1986, 108-
109).

68 In the theory of the enkaptic structural whole Dengerink sees too many remnants of the
old Aristotelian hierarchy of functions.
often pre-reflexive shift of position in the I–self relation. Unawares, one blushes (the position shift) and only then does one become aware of being ashamed (see above, b). Blushing is not just an ‘outer manifestation’ of the ‘animal’ substructure (see a). As part of the totality of human functioning shame discloses something about me, for instance, how bad and inferior I feel about myself. If we insist on ‘animal’ reaction, fine, as long as it is understood that this reaction as such (not secondarily) tells us something about the person blushing. Precisely the manifestations of emotion are fully personal.

These notions can be done justice to if we start out from a multi-layered act life: affective orientation as pre-reflexive expression of how I relate to myself and to the world.

(d) Layers in the act life: dispositions and ethos

Others have also suggested that the act life is multi-layered; especially Troost (1983), (1993) has been very explicit about this. In closing I will briefly consider his views. Troost’s primary interest is philosophical ethics. He sees this as praxeology, that is to say, as philosophy of human action insofar as determined by the ethos, dispositions (determined by temperament and character) and principles underlying ‘normative situational structures’. Troost insists that praxeology should be sharply distinguished from ethics, which is the special science investigating the proper nature and place of the moral aspect of love in the context of the whole of reality. Our interest is of course in the two areas of praxeological interest mentioned first: the ethos and the dispositions.

Dooyeweerd distinguished between the soul (or heart) and the acts. Thesis XXVIII expands this to character, temperament and dispositions:

Character as such is of a typical, normative nature. Temperament (qualified psychically) however is enkaptically bound in character.

And in temperament in turn are enkaptically bound typically biotically qualified dispositions (sex in particular), and the typically physically qualified dispositions (motor dispositions in the ‘tempo’ of the person).”

In Troost’s work we meet further elaboration of these notions. New here compared to Dooyeweerd is the introduction of ethos. Troost presents the ethos as a stratum in act life, in fact the lowest, the first circle around the heart as centre. Ethos refers to a fundamental motivating power in the personality, a basic, continually operative and integrating layer that directs and organizes all desire and striving. Moreover, the ethos is communal. Accordingly, we can also say of cultures that they are determined by ethos. Troost (1983, 108-13) holds that terms like mentality and attitude fall short here; ethos refers to the religious-ethical motivation in all human behaviour. The content of the ethos comes to expression in life views.

For Troost the dispositions also constitute the node or junction of intertwinement with the other body structures. To use a spatial metaphor, dispositions are placed between the ethos and the acts as a lower stratum (or depth phase) in act life. Characteristic of dispositions is that they are not bound to one single modal qualification. A virtue such as courage can manifest itself for
example in mutual interaction (daring), and in aesthetics (artistic boldness) or religion (the fortitude of faith). Troost draws a parallel here with the role played by intuition in the process of acquiring knowledge. Dooyeweerd called intuition an 'intermodal stratum in knowing — intermodal, because intuition involves at least some experience of the many-sided meaning coherence of reality. Dispositions are similar in this respect. They cannot be analysed in terms of a "merely conceptual braiding of anticipations and retrocipations." They are anchored in a depth-layer in act life, where modalities "come together again and interpenetrate." (Troost 1993, 64)

V. Conclusion

One point should be very clear by now: reformational philosophical anthropology derives its vitality and broadness from the sustained effort to think-together structure and dynamism. I have therefore concentrated on that and — though loath to do so — left aside the confrontations with thinkers such as Heidegger, Sartre, Bergson, Ricoeur, Gadamer, Buber (to mention but a few). In consequence of this the work of Zuidema, Van der Hoeven, Olthuis and Klapwijk remained underexposed.

Much is still to be done — in connection with structural theory we need reflection on themes such as identity and the I–self relation and, alongside of this, processing of scores of scientific findings especially in the field of (molecular) biology and the neurosciences. In connection with the dynamism we need to confront the emptiness and meaninglessness in the work of thinkers whose affinity is with Nietzsche (see Glas 1993). Moreover, the encounter with Jewish thought (Heschel, Levinas) and with Christian philosophical thinking in North America is only just beginning.

The future of reformational philosophical anthropology does not lie in specific philosophical disciplines (however necessary these may be), nor in impressionistic worldviews (however significant worldviews are). Its future lies in concentration on the intrinsic coherence of structural analysis and religious response.

69 Because they escape precise modal qualification, Troost suggests that insight into dispositions can only be gained in an idea-ruled (idee-matië) understanding, in an idea-regulated 'on the way' in the transcendental direction of time. For reformational philosophy this raises an old and prima facie purely theoretical problem: Do the modalities 'continue' right into the heart? One could paraphrase Troost's view for example such that for him the heart should primarily be sought 'below' or 'behind' the act structure, and that the dispositions — relative to this vertical axis — constitute a horizontal layer in which the lower substructures are interwoven with the act structure. In that case the integration of the lower structures in the act structure would take place via the dispositions rather than through a direct relationship with the heart. This notion — for which hints can be found in Dooyeweerd — would in any case lead to an appreciably more nuanced picture of the 'binding' and 'releasing' of substructures. If I understand Troost correctly, he would allow this interpretation for the substructures, though not for the modalities. His caution concerning the 'continuing' of the modalities 'into the' heart is epistemological: the cosmological concentration of the modal functions in the heart is a transcendental idea; at best we see dots (the idea-regulated 'on the way' in the transcendental direction of time), but we should not turn them into lines.
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Christina philosophical anthropology

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